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Abstract
Statistics has made tremendous advances since the times of Fisher, Neyman,
Jeffreys, and others, but the fundamental questions about probability and infer-
ence that puzzled our founding fathers still exist and might even be more relevant
today. To overcome these challenges, I propose to look beyond the two dominating
schools of thought and ask what do scientists need out of statistics, do the existing
frameworks meet these needs, and, if not, how to fill the void? To the first ques-
tion, I contend that scientists seek to convert their data, posited statistical model,
etc., into calibrated degrees of belief about quantities of interest. To the second
question, I argue that any framework that returns additive beliefs, i.e., probabili-
ties, necessarily suffers from false confidence—certain false hypotheses tend to be
assigned high probability—and, therefore, risks making systematically misleading
conclusions. This reveals the fundamental importance of non-additive beliefs in the
context of statistical inference. But non-additivity alone is not enough so, to the
third question, I offer a sufficient condition, called validity, for avoiding false con-
fidence, and present a framework, based on random sets and belief functions, that
provably meets this condition.
Keywords and phrases: Bayes; fiducial; foundations of statistics; inferential
model; p-value; plausibility function; random set.
1 Introduction
Statistics is concerned with the collection and analysis of data for the purpose of testing
existing theories and creating new ones, i.e., learning about the world through obser-
vation. This is central to the scientific method and, therefore, a solid foundation of
statistics is fundamental to the advancement of science. These foundations have been
severely shaken in recent years, however, starting perhaps with Ioannidis’s provocative
claim that most published research findings are false (Ioannidis 2005). Science is a “cul-
ture of doubt” (Feynman 1956), so Ioannidis’s skepticism is healthy. Unfortunately, the
support for his claim has continued to mount—see, e.g., Nuzzo (2014), the reports in Na-
ture1 on “Challenges in Irreproducible Research,” etc.—and the gravity of the problem is
∗Department of Statistics, North Carolina State University. Email: rgmarti3@ncsu.edu
1http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/reproducibility/index.html
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now becoming clear: large-scale replication projects have found that just 37/97 = 39% of
findings in psychology (Open Science Collaboration 2015), 11/18 = 61% in experimental
economics (Camerer et al. 2016), and 13/21 = 62% in social science (Camerer et al. 2018)
could be replicated. Rightfully so, this plight is now being called a replication crisis.
There are many factors that contribute to the replication crisis, some are statistics-
related and others are not.2 While statisticians can’t fully resolve the replication crisis,
it’s important that we acknowledge how we’ve contributed to the problem and do our
part to help. There are many ways to do so, but since the crisis is an attack on our
foundations, I believe that these require our direct attention.
Sadly, it’s necessary to emphasize that the foundations of statistics are practical, so
let me kick off my foundational discussion in the same way as Barnard (1985):
I shall be concerned with the foundations of the subject. But in case it should
be thought that this means I am not here strongly concerned with practical
applications, let me say that confusion about the foundations of the subject is
responsible, in my opinion, for much of the misuse of statistics that one meets
in fields of application. . .
The need to establish the practical relevance of foundations stems from the tendency
for discussions of the latter to turn abstract and philosophical, blurring their connection
to everyday statistical analysis. Both abstraction and philosophy are necessary but, in
order to be effective, they must be applied at the right level and in the right direction.
The two dominant schools of thought—frequentist and Bayesian—have co-existed for a
century despite many philosophical arguments for one approach over the other. The rea-
son these arguments have failed to firmly establish the foundations of statistics is that
they generally don’t align with the well-established intuition, experience, and method-
ology developed by data analysts. An important example is Birnbaum’s theorem3 (e.g.,
Berger and Wolpert 1984; Birnbaum 1962), which implies that the use of, say, the z- or
t-test about an unknown normal mean is, in a certain sense, illogical or lacks foundational
support, despite its (non-controversial) theoretical properties and many years of success-
ful applications. Needless to say, practitioners doubt the relevance of such a result, so its
impact has been rather limited.4
At the end of the day, the frequentist and Bayesian philosophies can co-exist because
we lack the necessary understanding to say what’s “right.” The question isn’t frequentist
or Bayesian? but, rather, how best to meet the needs of science? Obviously, philosophers
2Sociological factors, such as the “publish or perish” culture of academia, are major contributors to
the replication crisis; see Crane and Martin (2018a,b,d).
3There are two generally accepted notions in statistics: the sufficiency principle, which says that infer-
ences should depend only on the value of the minimal sufficient statistic, and the conditionality principle,
which says, roughly, inference should be conditioned on the observed values of ancillary statistics. A
more controversial notion is the likelihood principle, which says that inferences should only depend on
the shape of the likelihood function. Birnbaum’s theorem states that the sufficiency and conditionality
principles imply the likelihood principle. This is problematic because really only a Bayesian approach
satisfies the likelihood principle. Therefore, if I use, say, a t-test, which violates the likelihood principle,
then Birnbaum’s theorem says I’m making an illogical step somewhere because I must have violated the
well-accepted sufficiency or conditionality principles.
4In addition to the doubt about the relevance of Birnbaum’s theorem, there has been doubt about its
factuality. Indeed, Evans (2013) and Mayo (2014) have argued that the claim is wrong or at least that
its implications have been exaggerated.
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of science would have something to say about this, and Mayo (2018) gives a delightful,
modern, and comprehensive account of how she sees us getting “beyond the statistics
wars.” My specific path here is different from Professor Mayo’s although we have similar
objectives: we both aim to satisfy that astute outsider in Fraser (2011b) who asks “Why
don’t [statisticians] put their house in order?”
Statisticians know what an effective statistical analysis looks like, so, whatever would
be the foundations of the subject, it should be virtually uncontroversial. Towards this, I
like what Reid and Cox (2015) have to say:
. . . for any analysis that hopes to shed light on the structure of the problem,
modeling and calibrated inferences . . . seem essential.
To set the scene, my focus throughout this paper will be on the inference aspect. This
is not because modeling is easy or of lesser importance, but because the quantity about
which inferences are sought is often (though not always) defined only relative to the
posited model. Since the inference problem needn’t exist without a model, I will assume
that a model is already in place, and focus exclusively on the “calibrated inferences
seem essential” part. It’s still uncontroversial, but to make this suggestion operational,
a precise understanding of what each word means is necessary.
• Inference. While not strictly necessary, there is a strong desire to quantify un-
certainties via probabilities or, more generally, via degrees of belief, and to make
inferences based on these. Moreover, though it’ll take us a while to get there, I’ll
argue in Section 8.4 that my choice to formulate inferences based on degrees of
belief is, in a certain sense, without loss of generality.
• Calibrated. In metrology, calibration refers to the comparison of measurements to a
specified scale. In the present context, it’s the data analyst’s degrees of belief that
require a scale for interpretation, e.g., what belief values are sufficiently “large” or
“small” that justified conclusions can be drawn. Another side of calibration, which
appears in a follow-up quote from Reid and Cox (see Section 4 below), is that the
scale on which beliefs are interpreted should prevent “systematically misleading
conclusions,” i.e., provide control on the frequency of errors.
• Essential. This word in the trio I take very seriously, for reasons that I will explain.
Academic statisticians are encouraged (and incentivized) to focus on “methodol-
ogy,” the development of methods and software to be used (hopefully widely) by
practitioners and scientists. Therefore, the system is set up so that the experts,
the ones who develop methods, are involved in data analyses only at the inference
step, and even that involvement is indirect through the practitioner’s use of their
method/software. If this is the extent of statisticians’ involvement in most scien-
tific applications, should we be satisfied with methods that provide “approximate
calibration” for “most hypotheses”? I say no, so here I’ll take “essential” literally,
that calibrated beliefs are absolutely necessary.
Despite what this introduction might suggest, this paper is not really about founda-
tions. In particular, I make no attempt to write out any formal, rigorous, foundational
system. The above discussion was simply to establish that the foundations of statistical
inference are intended to serve practitioners so, whatever these foundations might look
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like, they should align with the goals of practitioners. That is, if “calibrated inferences
seem essential” for an effective statistical analysis, as I believe they are, then the foun-
dations ought to lead practitioners in that direction. An alternative, more realistic goal
is that if a particular framework or method does not necessarily lead practitioners in
the desired direction, then the foundations should at least weed this one out. The main
foundational contribution of this paper is in this latter vein.
After some setup and notation, I introduce main object of study in Section 2, namely,
an inferential model, a map from data, statistical model, etc., to a function that returns
the data analyst’s degrees of belief in hypotheses of interest. This formalizes the basic
idea that statistics is about the conversion of data and other inputs into beliefs about
the world. These inferential models can take many forms, but the most common are
those that return additive degrees of belief, i.e., probabilities. In Section 3, I argue
that additive inferential models are always at risk for being miscalibrated, and that
this can and does lead to “systematically misleading conclusions” (Reid and Cox 2015).
Therefore, whatever the foundations of statistical inference might be, if they are to align
with the “calibrated inferences seem essential” standard, then they ought to disavow
any approach that makes inferences based on probabilities. This suggests that there is
something fundamental about non-additive beliefs in this context. The presence of non-
additivity can be felt in the logic of classical statistical inference—e.g., rejecting the null
hypothesis does not mean accepting the alternative—but, to my knowledge, the extent
of non-additivity’s importance has yet to be fully elucidated.
This observation about additivity is just the beginning of the story, since non-additivity
alone is not enough to ward off false confidence. Additional constraints on the inferen-
tial model output are needed, beyond non-additivity, and Section 4 presents what I call
the validity condition, a mathematical formulation of the requirements contained in the
phrase “calibrated inferences seem essential.” After some important remarks in Section 5,
and a review of non-additive beliefs in Section 6, I describe the framework from Martin
and Liu (2016) that is able to meet the validity condition. What distinguishes this ap-
proach from others is the incorporation of a suitable, user-specified random set, which
results in a provably valid inferential model that returns a genuinely non-additive belief
function. General details about the construction along with a number of examples are
presented in Section 7. After another collection of remarks in Section 8, e.g., comparing
this valid inferential model to Fisher’s fiducial argument, I conclude in Section 9 with
some perspectives, open problems, etc.
2 Inferential models
2.1 Setup, notation, and objectives
To start, I assume that there is a statistical model PY |θ, indexed by a parameter θ ∈ Θ,
for the observable data Y ∈ Y. Here, as is common in discussions of inference, I will
assume that both the data and model are given, but they both deserve a few comments;
see also Crane and Martin (2018c).
• Intuitively, data is what the statistician gets to see; in fact, the data is the only
thing in a data analysis that’s really known. Data must certainly be relevant to the
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scientific problem, and the more informative the better. Technical details about
the collection of (relevant and informative) data are presented in, e.g., Hedayat
and Sinha (1991) and Hinkelmann and Kempthorne (2008). Here I use the adjec-
tive “observable” to distinguish the data Y from other random variables that are
“unobservable;” see Section 7.
• Lehmann and Casella (1998, Ch. 1) define a model as a family of probability mea-
sures on Y, indexed by a parameter θ ∈ Θ:
P = {PY |θ : θ ∈ Θ}. (1)
(Here PY |θ is a probability distribution for Y , a random variable, random vector,
or whatever, on Y, depending on θ; it need not be interpreted as a conditional
distribution of Y , given θ, derived from a joint distribution for the pair.) Guidelines
on the development of sound models are given, e.g., in Cox and Hinkley (1974),
Box (1980), and McCullagh and Nelder (1983); McCullagh (2002) gives a more
technical discussion. Here I will assume that the statistical model (1) is derived from
some knowledge about the data-generating process and/or from an exploratory data
analysis. While it’s not a focus of the present paper, this procedure of developing
sound models is far from routine, especially in modern, complex problems such as
network analysis (e.g., Crane 2018d).
Some might say that the model is incomplete in the sense that it’s missing an un-
certainty assessment about the parameter θ in the form of a prior; see, for example,
de Finetti (1972), Savage (1972), Gelman et al. (2004), and Kadane (2011). If a real sub-
jective prior is available, then the statistical inference problem is “simply an application
of probability” (Kadane 2011, p. xxv), in particular, Bayes’s theorem (e.g., Efron 2013a)
yields the conditional distribution of θ, given Y = y, which can be used for inference.
If genuine prior information is available, then surely one should use it. However, a sub-
stantial part of the literature adopts a view that no real prior information is available;
even in the Bayesian literature, the trend is to work with “default” or “non-informative”
priors that let the data speak for itself. One reason for this interest in prior-free scenarios
is, as Brad Efron said during a presentation at the 2016 Joint Statistical Meetings in
Chicago, that “scientists like to work on new problems.” In any case, my choice to omit
a prior from the model is to explore what can be done in cases where a fully satisfactory
prior distribution is not available. Incorporating prior information into the framework
I’m describing here is possible and I’ll have more to say on this in Section 9.
Given a sound statistical model and relevant data, the goal is to make certain state-
ments about the unknown θ. Classically, these “statements” come in the form of point
or interval estimates, hypothesis tests, etc.; prediction could also be included in this
list of tasks (e.g., Martin and Lingham 2016), but my focus here is on inference about
fixed-but-unknown quantities. A selling point of Bayesian and other distribution-based
approaches to statistical is that it is relatively straightforward to read off, for example,
point and interval estimates, from the posterior distribution. So, in the same spirit, I will
take this “posterior distribution” or, more generally, the data analyst’s degrees of belief
based on data and posited statistical model as the primitive, with estimates and tests
being derivatives. The next subsection makes this more precise.
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2.2 Definition
In the Bayesian literature (e.g., Kadane 2011; Lindley 2014), those elements discussed in
the previous section are converted to a probability distribution on Θ that encodes the
data analyst’s degrees of belief, from which inferences will be drawn. In other words, the
Bayesian procedure, or model, for inference is one in which the various inputs—relevant
data, sound statistical model, etc—are mapped to probabilities concerning the unknown
quantities. This idea can be generalized, as in the following definition, allowing for degrees
of belief output that need not be a probability distribution.
Definition 1. Fix the sample space Y, parameter space Θ, and let P be a statistical
model as in (1) that connects the two. Then an inferential model is a map from (P, y, . . .)
to a function by : 2
Θ → [0, 1] where, for each hypothesis A ⊆ Θ concerning the unknown
parameter, by(A) represents the data analyst’s degree of belief in the truthfulness of the
assertion “θ ∈ A.”
This definition formalizes the idea that inference is based on a process of converting
observations into degrees of belief about θ. That is, an inferential model is simply a rule
or procedure that describes how the observed data, posited statistical model, and perhaps
other ingredients (e.g., a prior distribution) are processed to quantify uncertainty for the
purpose of making inference.
This inferential model notion captures the familiar Bayesian approach, where the out-
put by is simply the posterior distribution for θ, given data y, under the assumed model
and a user-specified prior distribution. It also captures fiducial inference (Barnard 1995;
Fisher 1973; Zabell 1992), structural inference (Fraser 1968), generalized inference (Chi-
ang 2001; Weerahandi 1993), generalized fiducial inference (Hannig 2009, 2013; Hannig
et al. 2016, 2006; Hannig and Lee 2009; Lai et al. 2015), confidence distributions (Schweder
and Hjort 2002, 2016; Xie and Singh 2013), and Bayesian inference with data-dependent
priors (Fraser et al. 2010; Martin and Walker 2014, 2017). The key feature these all share
is that their inferential output, by, is a probability distribution. But Definition 1 does not
require by to be a probability measure, so it also covers situations where by is something
more general, such as a capacity, belief function, etc. In these latter approaches, by is
not additive, so it is possible that both by(A) and by(A
c) are small if data y is not espe-
cially informative about A. It turns out that additive versus non-additive has important
consequences; see Section 3.
Whatever the specific mathematical form of by, it can be used in a natural and straight-
forward way. That is, large values of by(A) and by(A
c) suggest that data strongly supports
the truthfulness and falsity, respectively, of the claim “θ ∈ A.”5 See Dempster (2014) for
a discussion of this general approach to inference through degrees of belief. Moreover, the
data analyst can, if desired, produce decision procedures based on the inferential output,
e.g., reject a null hypothesis “θ ∈ A” if and only if by(Ac) is sufficiently large.
Lastly, it should be clear that inferential models are not unique—my degrees of belief
might be different from yours. That inference requires individual judgment is not a short-
coming, it is what makes statistics an interesting subject and what makes statisticians’
expertise valuable. Depending on the application, however, I may want my degrees of
5Intermediate values of by(A), such as 0.4, are more difficult to interpret, but the same is true for
probabilities; see Section 5.3.
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belief to be meaningful to others, not just to myself, which puts certain constraints on
my inferential model. As Evans (2015, p. xvi) writes, “subjectivity can never be avoided
but its effects can be. . . controlled.” This control comes from external or, in some sense,
“non-subjective” considerations, and the remainder of the paper focuses on these.
3 Additive inferential models
3.1 Satellite conjunction analysis
Satellites orbiting Earth impact our everyday lives. For example, those of us with a poor
sense of direction rely on GPS navigation applications that use positioning information
from satellites to successfully reach our destinations. But it is not enough just to get
these satellites into orbit, they must be constantly monitored to prevent collision with
one another or with other kinds of debris. The challenge is that collision events cannot be
determined with certainty, so conjunction analysts must make important decisions, e.g.,
whether evasive maneuvers are necessary, in the face of uncertainty. This practically-
relevant application will serve as motivation for the forthcoming general discussion of
additive versus non-additive beliefs.
It is standard for conjunction analysts to use probabilities for uncertainty quantifi-
cation, and their approach is as follows. Consider a pair of orbiting satellites whose
positions and velocities are elements in three-space. The standard conjunction analysis
starts with an approximation to reduce it to a two-dimensional problem. That is, a plane
of closest approach is determined and then it is assumed that the satellites are each ap-
proaching this plane from an orthogonal direction, so only the projections onto this plane
are relevant. Let θ = (θ1, θ2)
> represent the difference between the true but unknown
satellite positions on this plane, so that small ‖θ‖ indicates the satellites are close, hence
a potential collision. Let Y = (Y1, Y2)
> denote the estimate of this difference in satellite
positions based on noisy data. A simple statistical model to describe this scenario is
Y ∼ N2(θ,Σ).
The normality assumption is often justified by invoking the central limit theorem, since
the estimate Y is the result of aggregating many position and velocity measurements.
Here, as is common in the conjunction analysis literature, I will assume that the covariance
matrix Σ can be accurately estimated so it will be taken as fixed.
The next step in the analysis, as reviewed in Balch et al. (2017), is to first construct
a corresponding posterior distribution for θ. Since θ is a location parameter, one might
consider an inferential model that describes degrees of belief based on
(θ | y) ∼ Πy := N2(y,Σ).
This is a flat-prior Bayes posterior and a fiducial/confidence distribution. Using informa-
tion on the satellites’ sizes, a collision radius, t, can be derived, so that a collision event is
defined as “‖θ‖ ≤ t.” The analysis proceeds by calculating the probability of collision (or
non-collision) based on the posterior distribution above. While experienced statisticians
may have reasons for concern (see below), this approach is not obviously unreasonable.
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However, an interesting and paradoxical phenomenon has been observed in the con-
junction analysis literature, called probability dilution. The basic idea is that lower data
quality (i.e., more noise in the position and velocity measurements) implies lower esti-
mated collision probability. This is paradoxical because lower quality data clearly means
more uncertainty but the probability calculation gives a different conclusion, namely, that
there is more certainty in the satellite’s safety. Of course, if conjunction analysts take a
low collision probability at face value, then they are likely to conclude that the satellite is
safe when, in fact, it may not be. To see this clearly, consider the simple scenario where
Σ = σ2I2. Then the non-collision probability, according to the aforementioned posterior
distribution, is a simple non-central chi-square calculation:
py(σ) := Πy(‖θ‖ > t) = 1− pchisq(t2/σ2, df = 2, ncp = ‖y‖2/σ2).
Figure 1 plots this non-collision probability as a function of σ. When σ is small, there is
no problem; but when σ is large, the non-collision probabilities are large, no matter what
the data y says. That is, even if the data suggests a collision, like in the ‖y‖2 = 0.5 case,
with enough noise, the posterior probabilities indicate that the satellite is safe. This turns
out to be a special case of the false confidence phenomenon discussed in Sections 3.2–3.3.
Statisticians will recognize this problem—inference on the length of a multivariate
normal mean vector—from Stein (1959), so the paradoxical conclusions might be ex-
pected. But this normal means problem is not the only one where issues like this arise, so
a better understanding of the causes and effects is valuable. Besides, the insights gleaned
from Stein’s investigation of this deceptively simple problem, in particular, the notions of
shrinkage and borrowing of strength, are now the foundations of modern high-dimensional
data analysis, so it is worth digging into these peculiar examples further.
3.2 Normal coefficient of variation
For data Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), consider a statistical model that posits the components of Y
to be independent and identically distributed (iid), with Yi ∼ N(µ, σ2), i = 1, . . . , n. Here
θ = (µ, σ2) is the unknown parameter, but primary interest is in φ = σ/µ, a quantity
called the coefficient of variation. One possible approach is to construct a Bayesian
inferential model where, given a prior distribution for θ, the corresponding posterior for
θ is obtained via Bayes’s formula, and then a marginal posterior for φ is derived from
that of θ using the ordinary probability calculus.
Since interest is in φ, I will adopt the reference prior for θ, now expressed as θ =
(φ, σ), presented in Berger et al. (1999, Example 7), designed specifically for cases where
inference on φ is the goal. Using the standard default conditional prior pi(σ | φ) ∝ σ−1,
for σ, given φ, and the reference prior for ψ,
pi(φ) ∝ {|φ|(φ2 + 1
2
)1/2}−1,
given in their Equation (38), one obtains the proper marginal posterior for φ:
piy(φ) ∝ pi(φ)e−
n
2φ2
(1− y¯2
D2
)
∫ ∞
0
zn−1e−
nD2
2
(z− y¯
D2φ
)2
dz, (2)
where y¯ = n−1
∑n
i=1 yi and D
2 = n−1
∑n
i=1 y
2
i . This agrees with their Equation (39).
The integral can be evaluated numerically, so posterior computations via Markov chain
Monte Carlo, e.g., the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm, are relatively straightforward.
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(d) ‖y‖2 = 1.5 vs t = 1
Figure 1: Plots of the non-collision probability, py(σ), as a function of σ for several
configurations of y. Here the collision threshold is t = 1.
However, like in the satellite conjunction analysis example from the previous section,
there is no guarantee that this posterior probability distribution for the interest parameter
provides reliable inference. Here I will explore this question using a simulation study. Let
Y consist of n = 10 iid samples from N(µ, σ2), with µ = 0.1 and σ = 1; then the true
value of φ is 10. Next, consider a hypothesis about φ, namely, A = (−∞, 9], which
happens to be false. Let Πy(A) denote the probability of this hypothesis with respect to
the posterior distribution in (2). Then ΠY (A) is a random variable, as a function of Y ,
and I am interested in its distribution function, Gθ(α) = PY |θ{ΠY (A) ≤ α}. Figure 2
shows the estimated distribution function, based on 1000 data sets. The most striking
feature of this plot is the high concentration of the distribution’s mass around value
1. This is problematic because, remember, this is the posterior probability of a false
hypothesis about φ. In those instances when Πy(A) ≈ 1 and, therefore, Πy(Ac) ≈ 0, the
only reasonable conclusion would be that the data support hypothesis A. Since these
9
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Figure 2: Plot of the estimated distribution function Gθ(α) = PY |θ{ΠY (A) ≤ α} of the
Bayesian posterior probability, ΠY (A), where A = (−∞, 9] is a false hypothesis about
the coefficient φ = σ/µ when µ = 0.1 and σ = 1.
problematic instances are apparently frequent, inferences drawn based on the posterior
distribution described above would be systematically misleading.
It is worth mentioning that there is nothing special about the particular settings in
this illustration. For any values of (n, µ, σ), there exists a hypothesis A, perhaps of similar
form to the one above, such that, even if A is false, the posterior probability assigned to
it will tend to be large; see Section 3.3.
Some statisticians might also recognize this normal coefficient of variation problem as
one in the collection of challenging inference problems identified by Gleser and Hwang
(1987) and Dufour (1997) and discussed in Bertanha and Moreira (2018). One could say
that this and others in these classes are not a practical problems, and that might be
true. But these “impossible” inference problems are precisely the ones we should use to
test our foundations and intuition, in the same way that we test our understanding of
measure theory by constructing and examining non-measurable sets, etc.
3.3 False confidence theorem
The previous two subsections showed that there are instances where inferences based
on a Bayesian inferential model would be systematically misleading. It turns out that
these issues have nothing to do with the Bayesian features of those solutions. Instead,
false confidence is a consequence of using additive degrees of beliefs, i.e., probabilities, to
describe uncertainty. The following theorem makes this precise.
Theorem 1 (Balch et al. 2017). Consider probability measure Πy with a density function
that is bounded and continuous for each y. Then for any θ ∈ Θ, any α ∈ (0, 1), and any
p ∈ (0, 1), there exists a set A ⊂ Θ such that
A 63 θ and PY |θ{ΠY (A) ≥ 1− α} ≥ p.
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Therefore, any inferential model with additive degrees of belief—including Bayes,
fiducial, etc.—will be at risk of false confidence. That is, there are false hypotheses to
which Πy will tend to assign high probability, hence “systematically misleading conclu-
sions.” It is important to emphasize that the theorem only says there exists hypotheses
afflicted by false confidence. Certainly, some of these hypotheses are trivial, e.g., com-
plements of very small subsets of Θ, but the examples in Sections 3.1–3.2 reveal that
non-trivial hypotheses can be affected too; see, also, Carmichael and Williams (2018).
In my experience, the non-trivial yet problematic hypotheses have unusual shapes: the
complement of a disc in the plane and the complement of a cone in the upper half-plane
in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. These unusual shapes most commonly arise when
hypotheses concern a non-linear function of the full parameter. Similar concerns about
the performance of Bayesian posterior inference for non-linear functions of θ were raised
in Fraser (2011a) and Fraser et al. (2016), but Theorem 1 expands on their conclusions
in several directions, in particular, it applies to any additive inferential model, not just
Bayesian, and to more general hypotheses. Moreover, it helps to explain why, as advised
by Cox (2006, p. 66) and others, it is dangerous to manipulate, e.g., marginalize, fiducial
and confidence distributions according to the usual probability calculus.
When genuine prior information is available in the form of a proper prior distribution
for θ, so that the behavior of ΠY (A) would be assessed with respect to the marginal
distribution of Y derived from the joint distribution of (Y, θ), then false confidence is
also of no concern. For one thing, there are no false hypotheses in such a context since θ
is not an unknown parameter in the marginal distribution of Y . Also, there are certain
automatic controls on the distribution of ΠY (A) in such settings, but these bounds are
generally only as meaningful as the postulated prior. See Section 5.4.
There is also a connection between the false confidence theorem and the non-existence
of a truly “non-informative” prior distribution established in Proposition 2.1 of Martin
and Liu (2016). That is, if every prior probability distribution is “informative” simply by
virtue of its additivity, not because it’s based on real prior information, then there will
be false hypotheses towards which the posterior distribution is pushed.
In certain communities, additive probabilities are called precise in the sense that
the postulated statistical model fully captures all the existing uncertainty.6 Such an
assumption is always difficult to justify but, for sure, said justification would require that
the prior distribution be informative in some sense. With the commonly used default
prior distributions, any claims of “precision” would be questionable:
[Bayes’s formula] does not create real probabilities from hypothetical probabil-
ities... (Fraser 2014, p. 249)
There are so many hypotheses in the σ-algebra upon which the probability is defined
and, given the necessarily limited informativeness of the data, it is unrealistic to expect
that the posterior can assign meaningful or otherwise reliable probabilities to every one.
Therefore, there must be hypotheses about which the posterior probabilities should not
be trusted, and this is what the false confidence theorem says.
On its own, that there exists hypotheses afflicted by false confidence may not be a
serious concern. The problem is that one generally does not know which hypotheses
6The 2019 International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities, http://isipta2019.ugent.be, has
a theme, related to this point, that I like: “there’s more to uncertainty than probabilities.”
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are afflicted and which are not. Arguably the strongest selling point of Bayesian and
other approaches that produce probabilities as output is that they provide a means to
answer virtually any question about the unknowns, specifically, that the full posterior
can be marginalized to any quantity of interest to make justifiable inferences. The false
confidence theorem says that this understanding is wrong, that is, there are features of θ
for which certain questions cannot be answered reliably or justifiably; see, also, Gru¨nwald
(2018). Whether those afflicted hypotheses are of any practical interest depends on the
context, but not knowing which ones they are puts the data analyst at risk. Short of
identifying those afflicted hypotheses in each individual situation to mitigate risk, the only
option is to avoid false confidence altogether, which, according to Theorem 1, requires
breaking additivity. Not every non-additive belief will be free of false confidence, however,
so some additional constraints are needed, as discussed in Section 4 below.
4 Validity condition
If false confidence is undesirable, as I say it is, then an important question is how to
avoid it. Theorem 1 says additivity must be abandoned, and I will discuss specific types
of non-additive degrees of belief in Section 6. But non-additivity alone is not enough to
avoid false confidence so, before getting into those details, here I introduce a condition
that will ensure false confidence can be avoided. The construction of an inferential model
that achieves this condition is the topic of Section 7 below.
The inferential model formulation is one where inferences are drawn according to a
data analyst’s degree of belief based on data, a statistical model, etc. In a vacuum, I
am free to construct and interpret my degrees of belief in any way that I please. But
if the goal is to communicate my degrees of belief to others, to justify my conclusions,
then some kind of objective or at least agreed-upon scale is needed in order to interpret
degrees of belief. For example, if I conclude that hypothesis A is false because by(A
c) > c,
then why might you find this convincing? It is not necessary that your degrees of belief
agree 100% with mine, it is enough if I can demonstrate that the event {y : by(Ac) > c}
is rare if A is actually true. Of course, a more precise connection between the threshold
“c” and the notion of “rare” are needed (see Definition 2) but the basic idea is familiar
and uncontroversial. Indeed, Cox and Hinkley (1974, p. 45–46) write
We should not follow procedures which for some possible parameter values
would give, in hypothetical repetitions, misleading conclusions most of the
time.
Recently, Reid and Cox (2015) echoed this point
Even if an empirical frequency-based view of probability is not used directly
as a basis for inference, it is unacceptable if a procedure. . . of representing
uncertain knowledge would, if used repeatedly, give systematically misleading
conclusions.
Both of these remarks mention “procedures” which seems to suggest a purely frequentist
or behaviorist mode of reasoning based on rules and suggested actions, e.g., reject a
hypothesis if and only if such and such happens. But Fisher (1973) and others (e.g.,
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Mayo 1996, 2018; Mayo and Cox 2006) argue that there’s more going on here, that the
frequentist’s error rate control leads to an inductive logic for justifying conclusions in
individual instances. Indeed, Fisher (1973, p. 46) writes
...the feeling induced by a test of significance has an objective basis in that
the probability statement on which it is based ia fact communicable to, and
verifiable by, other rational minds. The level of significance in such cases
fulfils the conditions of a measure of the rational grounds for the disbelief it
engenders.
Along similar lines, Mayo (2018, p. 16) formalizes the notion of an argument from obser-
vation, through the absence of error, to conclusion as follows:
There is evidence an error is absent to the extent that a procedure with a very
high capability of signaling the error, if and only if it is present, nevertheless
detects no error.
To avoid what Reid and Cox call “unacceptable,” and to facilitate the inductive logic
of Fisher and Mayo, some kind of calibration is needed, and I suggest the following
constraint on ones inferential model.
Definition 2. An inferential model (P, y, . . .) 7→ by is valid if
sup
θ 6∈A
PY |θ{bY (A) > 1− α} ≤ α, ∀ α ∈ [0, 1], ∀ A ⊂ Θ. (3)
That is, if θ 6∈ A, so that the hypothesis A is false, then bY (A), as a function of Y ∼ PY |θ,
is stochastically no larger than Unif(0, 1).
The validity property (3) implies that, if A is false, then there is a small probability—
with respect to the posited statistical model—that bY (A) takes large values. In other
words, data are unlikely to provide strong support for false assertions, therefore avoid-
ing Reid and Cox’s “systematically misleading conclusions.” Since validity prevents the
degrees of belief in a false hypothesis from being too large, in a distributional sense,
it follows that a valid inferential model is not susceptible to false confidence. Similar
calibration properties are discussed in Balch (2012) and Denœux and Li (2018).
Of course, since probabilities are susceptible to false confidence, they must automat-
ically fail to be valid in the sense of Definition 2. However, this can be seen directly
from the fact that (3) covers all assertions, including singletons and their complements.
Indeed, if A is the complement of a singleton and by is a probability measure, then usually
by(A) = 1 for all y, so (3) fails. But the examples in Section 3 demonstrate that it is not
just these trivial hypotheses that can be afflicted by false confidence.
There are two specific questions that I would like to address. First, why be concerned
about all hypotheses? Instead, one could ask that the inferential model satisfy a condition
like that in (3) just for the one or few hypotheses of interest. There is no problem
weakening the condition (3) to hold just for a specific collection of hypotheses, see Martin
and Liu (2016, Def. 4.2), and indeed this would be satisfactory to the data analyst
in a specific application. But at the meta level where data scientists are developing
methods and corresponding software to used by others across applications, this strong
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control on performance is necessary. If I develop a method that automates the inferential
model construction, with corresponding software that returns degrees of beliefs for any
hypothesis, then unless I identify and warn the user about those problematic hypotheses,
then I should assume that users will in fact use it for any hypothesis and protect myself
from the associated risk. For example, if I recommend an inferential model that returns
degrees of belief about θ = (µ, σ) based on samples from N(µ, σ2), and I fail to warn the
user about considering hypotheses of the form A = {(µ, σ) : σ ≤ cµ}, for given c ∈ R,
then any erroneous conclusions based on this would be my responsibility. Consequently,
the data scientist developing methods for mass consumption actually has skin in the game
(Taleb 2018), potentially a lot, so in order to protect him/herself from the associated risk
a strong, uniform control on performance like in (3), for any hypotheses the user might
be interested in, would be desired.
Second, why the specific “1− α” in (3)? In other words, (3) could be written as
sup
θ 6∈A
PY |θ{bY (A) > gA(α)} ≤ α,
for some function gA(α), so why not allow this more general notion of validity? Recall
that a primary motivation for the validity condition was to have a scale on which the
degrees of belief could be interpreted. To me at least, interpreting probabilities is a
challenge because they are relative. For example, Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight website
estimated the (posterior) probability of a Donald Trump victory in the 2016 U.S. pres-
idential election at 0.28, which was weak enough to predict that Hilary Clinton would
win (e.g., Crane and Martin 2018e), whereas, in, say, the context of variable selection in
regression, a (posterior) probability of 0.28 assigned to one of the 2p possible subsets of
the p predictor variables would be very strong support for that configuration. In the same
way, the more general definition with gA(α) in the above display would allow the scale of
interpretation to depend on the hypothesis A as well as on other specific features of the
problem. To avoid the confusion of a moving scale of interpretation, an absolute scale is
needed, but the specific choice of Unif(0, 1) as an absolute scale is not essential—it’s just
familiar and natural.7 See, also, Section 5.4.
An important consequence of the validity condition is that procedures designed based
on the inferential model output will have frequentist guarantees. To see this clearly, define
the dual to the inferential model’s degrees of belief as
py(A) = 1− by(Ac), A ⊆ Θ.
Of course, since the focus is on non-additive degrees of belief, py is different from by. The
interpretation of py is as a measure of plausibility, which I discuss further in Section 6.
Since (3) holds for all A ⊆ Θ, there is an equivalent formulation in terms of py, i.e.,
sup
θ∈A
PY |θ{pY (A) ≤ α} ≤ α, ∀ α ∈ [0, 1], ∀ A ⊆ Θ. (4)
7To see what’s special about the Unif(0, 1) scale, consider the following example. Suppose you’re
visiting a place you’ve never been before and the weatherman on the TV says there’s a 10% chance
of rain. Likely you wouldn’t be too concerned about not having an umbrella, but why? Maybe this
weatherman reports only 0–10% chance of rain, no matter the circumstances, so that a 10% chance
is actually very high. That this possibility seems totally absurd suggests that it’s “natural” to think
of probabilities as being calibrated to a Unif(0, 1) scale, i.e., that it rains only 10% of the days the
weatherman predicts a 10% chance of rain, and that’s why I’ve imposed this in (3).
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Besides complementing the degrees of belief, py provides a simple and intuitive recipe to
construct procedures with guaranteed frequentist error rate control.
Theorem 2. Let (P, y, . . .) 7→ by be an inferential model that satisfies the validity con-
dition in Definition 2. Fix α ∈ (0, 1).
(a) Consider a testing problem with H0 : θ ∈ A versus H1 : θ 6∈ A, where A is any subset
of Θ. Then the test, Ty, that rejects H0 if and only if py(A) ≤ α has frequentist
Type I error probability upper-bounded by α. That is,
sup
θ∈A
PY |θ(TY rejects H0) ≤ α.
(b) Define the following data-dependent subset of Θ:
Cα(y) =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : py({ϑ}) > α
}
. (5)
Then the frequentist coverage probability of Cα(Y ) is lower-bounded by 1−α, making
(5) a nominal 100(1− α)% confidence region. That is,
inf
θ
PY |θ{Cα(Y ) 3 θ} ≥ 1− α.
This makes clear my previous claim that, if one has a valid inferential model, then
decision procedures with good properties are immediate. It is worth pointing out again
that Theorem 2(a) hold for all hypotheses A, even those problematic ones concerning a
non-linear feature of the full parameter θ like the ones that cause the false confidence
phenomenon in additive inferential models. Moreover, if φ = φ(θ) is a some feature of
interest, then the set {
ϕ ∈ φ(Θ) : supϑ:φ(ϑ)=ϕ py({ϑ})
}
,
is nominal 100(1 − α)% confidence region for φ. How to specifically construct a valid
inferential model will be discussed in Section 7.
5 Remarks
5.1 BFFs and philosophy of science
Meng (2017) describes the efforts of a group working in and around the foundations of
statistics and probability. That group goes by the name of “BFF” which has a double-
meaning: the first, “Bayes, Frequentist, and Fiducial,” is one that only a statistician
might guess, while the second, “Best Friends Forever,” is a modern pop culture term of
endearment. The first two letters—B and F—are familiar to statisticians and below I
briefly summarize these and make a connection to perspectives in philosophy of science.
• Bayesian. The defining feature of the Bayesian approach is that it is based strictly
on probability calculus. That is, one starts with a statistical model that relates
observable data to some unknown parameters, adds a prior probability distribution
that is meant to describe uncertainty about those parameters, and then this prior is
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updated, via Bayes’s formula, to a posterior distribution about the parameter given
the observed data. The rationale behind the Bayesian approach to learning is that,
roughly, with sufficiently informative data, perhaps after several iterations of this
prior-to-posterior updating, those hypotheses which are “true” will have posterior
probability close to 1, everything else having posterior probability close to 0. That
is, learning is achieved by confirmation, in the spirit of Carnap (1962), Jeffreys
(1961), and others, through the aggregation of evidence supporting a hypothesis.
• Frequentist. It is possible to talk about a Bayesian approach because the framework
is normative, i.e., it gives a recipe for carrying out an analysis. It is much harder,
however, to describe a frequentist approach, it is more of a philosophy or a sense in
which any statistical approach or method can be evaluated. The idea is that, for
a relevant scientific hypothesis, statistical methods should be good at assessing the
plausibility of that hypothesis, where “good” is in the sense that the probability
they detect departures between data and the hypothesis is low when there is none
and high when there is. But since not detecting departures between data and a
hypothesis does not imply truthfulness of the hypothesis, this strategy cannot be
used for direct confirmation, only for refutation. That is, with sufficiently informa-
tive data and sufficiently good statistical methods, any hypothesis that is false is
likely to be refuted. This lines up with the views of Popper (1959), Lakatos (1978),
and Mayo (1996) who argue that knowledge is gained through falsification.
I have chosen to split the discussion of Bayesian and frequentist into two separate
bullet points, but they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, since frequentism is not an
approach, but rather a means of evaluating a method, one can study the frequentist
properties of Bayesian methods. It is often the case that Bayesian solutions agree with
classical frequentist solutions asymptotically, e.g., a Bernstein–von Mises theorem holds,
hence the Bayesian solutions also have the desirable frequentist properties asymptoti-
cally. In cases like these where Bayesian posterior probabilities have certain calibration
properties, a verification–falsification balance can be achieved; see Box (1980) and Rubin
(1984). However, these niceties are not universal since, as the normal coefficient of vari-
ation example, the false confidence theorem, and similar results in Fraser (2011a) and
Fraser et al. (2016) indicate, these asymptotic guarantees may not be fully satisfactory
and, as Gleser and Hwang (1987) remark, might even be misleading in certain cases.
Compared to the B and F above, it is more difficult to pin down precisely what
the second F, fiducial, is. This is partly because, as Zabell (1992) elucidates, Fisher’s
explanation of the “fiducial argument” changed significantly over time. At its genesis,
Fisher’s idea was to derive a sort of posterior distribution for the unknown parameter
without a prior and without invoking Bayes’s theorem, an ambitious goal. To see how
this works, let θ be an unknown scalar parameter and suppose that T = T (Y ) is a scalar
sufficient statistic, having distribution function Fθ. Take any p ∈ [0, 1] and assume that
the equation p = Fθ(t) can be solved uniquely for t, given θ, and for θ, given t. That is,
assume there exists tp(θ) and θp(t) such that
p = Fθ(tp(θ)) = Fθp(t)(t), ∀ (t, θ).
If the sampling model is “monotone” in the sense that, for all (p, t, θ),
tp(θ) ≥ t ⇐⇒ θp(t) ≤ θ,
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then it is an easy calculation to show that
p = PT |θ{T ≤ tp(θ)} = PT |θ{θp(T ) ≤ θ}. (6)
The above expression is a mathematical fact, but has no direct connection to the inference
problem because it doesn’t depend on the observed T = t. Fisher’s big idea was to fix
T = t and define the fiducial probability of the event {θ ≥ θp(t)} to be equal to p. In
other words, for t the observed value of T , Fisher defined
“P{θ ≥ θp(t)}” = p, ∀ p ∈ [0, 1].
The collection {θp(t) : p ∈ [0, 1]}, for fixed t, defines the quantiles of a distribution
and, therefore, a distribution itself. Fisher called this the fiducial distribution of θ, given
T = t. Naturally, since the fiducial probabilities are “derived” from calculations based
on the sampling distribution, PT |θ, of T for fixed θ, Fisher’s interpretation of the fiducial
probabilities was in a frequentist sense. So it’s no surprise that the distinction between
Fisher’s fiducial quantile θp(t) and Neyman’s 100p% upper confidence limit for θ is blurry.
Fisher ran into trouble, however, in the extension of his fiducial argument to multi-
dimensional parameters. The challenges he faced were, in particular, non-uniqueness
and a failure of the fiducial probability for some hypotheses to maintain the calibration
property suggested by the connection to the sampling distribution in the expression (6).
Notice that these challenges Fisher faced are both part of the high-level message coming
out of the false confidence theorem in Section 3.3, i.e., that data is not informative
enough to uniquely identify precise and reliable probabilities for every hypothesis. Fisher’s
response to these challenges was to back away from the sampling interpretation of his
fiducial probabilities, opting instead for a more subjective, conditional view. This effort,
however, was unsuccessful, which led to fiducial being labeled Fisher’s “one great failure”
(Zabell 1992, p. 369) and “biggest blunder” (Efron 1998, p. 105). Zabell (1992, p. 382)
summarizes Fisher’s motivation and efforts beautifully:
Fisher’s attempt to steer a path between the Scylla of unconditional behavior-
ist methods which disavow any attempt at “inference” and the Charybdis of
subjectivism in science was founded on important concerns, and his personal
failure to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem means only that the
problem remains unsolved, not that it does not exist.
There are many other nice papers that discuss Fisher’s views and insights on fiducial and
inverse probability, among other things; see, e.g., Aldrich (2000, 2008), Edwards (1997),
Savage (1976), Seidenfeld (1992), and Zabell (1989).
Both the aforementioned B and F correspond to well-established schools of thought
in the philosophy of science, so what about fiducial? If the fiducial argument is difficult
to understand even as a statistical approach or method, then understanding what, if any,
philosophical position it corresponds to is all the more difficult. Maybe there’s a new
branch of philosophy of science waiting to be discovered. A fiducial-style philosophy of
science would be similar to a confirmationist’s view in the sense that it would be based on
probabilities (or some other degree of belief measure) but also similar to a falsificationist’s
view in the sense that these probabilities can only be used as a tool for refutation, not for
proof. In order to make such a theory work, I think some form of non-additivity would be
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necessary to handle the important and very common case where data isn’t inconsistent
with either A or Ac. I’ll leave it to the experts in philosophy of science to decide if the
precise formulation of such a theory is worth pursuing.
5.2 “The most important unresolved problem”
Even if it’s not what Fisher had intended, at a high level, the fiducial argument can be
viewed as an attempt to achieve some sort of middle-ground between the more widely-
accepted B and F, one that would provide prior-free, data-dependent degrees of belief, like
a Bayesian posterior, that simultaneously have certain frequentist calibration properties.
Savage (1961) described the fiducial argument as “a bold attempt to make the Bayesian
omelet without breaking the Bayesian eggs.” As the quote from Zabell above communi-
cates, the fact that Fisher’s solution was unsuccessful doesn’t mean that a satisfactory
solution isn’t possible or that the problem itself isn’t interesting and worth pursuing.
Indeed, Efron (2013b, p. 41) says that
...perhaps the most important unresolved problem in statistical inference is the
use of Bayes theorem in the absence of prior information.
Similar comments can be found in Efron (1998) and, even more recently, during his
featured address during the 2016 BFF workshop at Rutgers,8 Efron referred to the above
problem as the Holy Grail of statistics.
To be clear, there is no problem at all to get a posterior distribution without using a
prior or Bayes’s theorem. Any data-dependent probability distribution on the parameter
space would be a candidate. What Efron is talking about is more than just getting a
posterior distribution without a prior; he’s asking for a “prior-free” procedure to construct
a “posterior distribution” that is somehow reliable, that has performance guarantees. It’s
in this sense that my efforts here, which do not have anything directly to do with Bayes’s
theorem, are relevant to Efron’s “most important unresolved problem.”
My claim here is that the key to solving this most important problem is actually very
simple: one just needs to be willing to abandon the requirement that degrees of belief be
additive. As the false confidence theorem implies, however you construct your additive
degrees of belief, there will exist hypotheses for which the probabilities lack the desired
calibration and, consequently, would be “unacceptable” according to Reid and Cox. So,
going non-additive, i.e., adopting a framework in which degrees of belief are measured
by some non-additive set function, is the only way to proceed towards a solution to this
open problem. But non-additivity alone isn’t enough. To avoid false confidence—and
solve the fundamental problem—an additional constraint is needed, something like the
validity condition in Section 4. There is, of course, no free lunch, so any new framework
that can achieve this goal must necessarily make sacrifices elsewhere; see Section 9.
5.3 Beyond p and P
In Summer 2018, the statistics community was buzzing about p-values, their interpreta-
tion, and their limitations. Naturally, this got me thinking about the statistical “debates”
8https://statistics.rutgers.edu/bff2016
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pitting p-values and the NHST (null hypothesis significance testing) camp against poste-
rior probabilities, Bayes factors, and the Bayesian camp. To set the scene, while p-values
have received—and withstood—more than their fair share of scrutiny over the years (e.g.,
Berger and Sellke 1987; Schervish 1996), the discussion heated up when scientists started
pointing fingers at the statistical community for low replication rates, etc. A bold move
was made in 2015 when the editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology, or BASP,
banned the use of p-values—and much of the modern statistical toolbox—in their journal
(Trafimow and Marks 2015). Naturally, this attracted media attention (e.g., Woolston
2015) and even sparked an unprecedented response from the American Statistical Asso-
ciation (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016), with a follow-up conference9 and special issue of
The American Statistician.10
My suspicion, which was confirmed by Professor David Trafimow in a personal com-
munication, was that banning p-values was not a solution in and of itself but, rather, an
impetus for change, forcing researchers to think harder about how they reason from data
to conclusion, potentially leading to new ideas and higher quality research. Whether this
strategy will be successful remains to be seen (e.g., Fricker Jr. et al. 2018), but almost
anything is better than researchers “p-ing” everywhere (Valentine et al. 2015). Still, it
makes sense to ask if contributions from the statistics community have been helpful. The
dust is perhaps still settling, but, based on the expert commentary supplementing the
ASA statement, the follow-up by Ionides et al. (2017), the recent proposal of Benjamin
et al. (2017) to simply change the default “p < 0.05” cutoff to “p < 0.005,” and the
plethora of criticism that followed (e.g., Crane 2018b; Lakens et al. 2018; McShane et al.
2018; Trafimow et al. 2018), it seems that statisticians’ views are as diverse as ever.
The response from the Bayesian or, at least, the non-NHST camp is that it’s better
in some sense to rely on probabilities for making inferences. As part of the justification
for the p-value ban, Trafimow and Marks (2015) say
the [p-value] fails to provide the probability of the null hypothesis, which is
needed to provide a strong case for rejecting it.
That a p-value is not the probability that the null hypothesis is true is, of course, a
mathematical fact. But is it really necessary to have such a probability for making
inferences? Fisher says no:
As Bayes perceived, the concept of mathematical probability affords a means,
in some cases, of expressing inferences from observational data, involving a
degree of uncertainty, and of expressing them rigorously... yet it is by no
means axiomatic that the appropriate inferences... should always be rigorously
expressible in terms of this same concept. (Fisher 1973, p. 40)
And about the p-value—or observed significance level—he says
It is more primitive, or elemental than, and does not justify, any exact prob-
ability statement about the proposition. (Fisher 1973, p. 46)
9https://ww2.amstat.org/meetings/ssi/2017/
10https://ww2.amstat.org/meetings/ssi/2017/callforpapers.cfm
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But before asking about whether probability is a necessity, an even more basic question is
if a genuine probability is available in general. If we put together the famously provocative
quote from de Finetti (1990)—probability does not exist—with the refreshingly blunt
remark of Fraser’s on page 11 above, then we start to see how concerning this is.11 If
probabilities exist only in our minds, and don’t become “real” simply by updating via
Bayes’s formula, then how can they be justified as relevant to a scientific problem? For
example, reconsider the highly-publicized predictions of 2016 U.S. presidential election by
Nate Silver on his FiveThirtyEight website/blog (e.g., Crane and Martin 2018e). On the
day of the election, Silver predicted Hilary Clinton would win with probability 0.72 and,
therefore, Donald Trump would win with probability 0.28. These numbers are based on
specified prior distributions, statistical models, and polling data, all combined via Bayes’s
formula and evaluated on a computer running Markov chain Monte Carlo. Does Silver
making such a probability statement suddenly imply that the election will be determined
by the flip of a 72/28 coin? Of course not. The numbers may be meaningful to Silver
himself in many ways, e.g., prices for bets he’s willing to make, but the relevance of Silver’s
numbers to me, to any other consumer, or to “reality” must be established. As I see it,
there are only two ways this relevance argument can be made: either I understand and
agree with all of Silver’s modeling assumptions, and accept his subjective probabilities
as my own, or I simply trust that Silver’s predictions are accurate or otherwise reliable.
The former is quite unlikely, especially for consumers without statistical training; the
latter is a choice that I’m free to make or not, though recent results suggest that Silver’s
predictions may not be so reliable (Crane 2018a,c). In any case, (posterior) probabilities
are not objective or otherwise obviously relevant to the scientific problem at hand, their
relevance has to be established in some way.
While I am skeptical about being able to justify the relevance of a probability distribu-
tion to a scientific problem,12 it is worth pointing out that there would be a tremendous
payoff if, in fact, it could be done. Arguably, the more natural way to think about
knowledge is as a process by which evidence piles up in favor of some hypothesis un-
til which its truthfulness is undisputed. This confirmationinst style of learning is quite
powerful because one effectively has access to “truth” via probability ≈ 0 or ≈ 1 events
and what Shafer (2016) calls Cournot’s Principle; see also Shafer (2007) and Shafer and
Vovk (2006). Popper’s falsificationist view emerged, not because it’s more powerful, but
because, like me, he doubted the confirmationist’s premise that a meaningful probability
distribution—one that could be continuously updated via Bayes’s theorem, eventually
pointing to “truth”—generally exists. Popper’s only option, therefore, is to discard the
strong existence assumption, but the price he pays is not being able to judge a hypothesis
as “true,” only as “not yet proven false.”
Back to Summer 2018. Given the “p versus P” debates going on at the time, and the
fact that this focus on NHST versus Bayes seemed to be misaligned, I planned to write
a non-technical paper about moving forward, “beyond p and P ,” by thinking in terms of
11To be fair, Trafimow and Marks (2015) acknowledge that the use of posterior distributions based on
default priors are not satisfactory substitutes for genuine prior probabilities.
12Consider an ideal case where a true and, therefore, relevant prior exists, e.g., with exchangeable
sequences where de Finetti’s theorem applies (de Finetti 1937; Hewitt and Savage 1955). Even in such
cases, the true prior, whose existence is guaranteed by the theorem, depends on the data, so one actually
needs an infinite—or at least long—data sequence to identify the true prior.
20
a third “p”—plausibility—that, when equipped with the validity condition, can achieve
much of what both the frequentists and Bayesians want. Not long after my plan for this
crystallized, Deborah Mayo’s book (Mayo 2018) appeared wherein she talks about getting
“beyond the Stat Wars.” Aside from having a more clever name—Stat Wars—for the
controversy, her presentation is much more comprehensive than I could do, so I decided
to take my efforts in a different direction, hence this manuscript.
5.4 Bayesian validity?
According to the false confidence theorem, validity is not compatible with a Bayesian
inferential model or, for that matter, any other the produces additive degrees of belief as
output. But the validity condition, in Equation (3), is rather strong, so one could ask if
the Bayesian approach satisfies perhaps some weaker form of the validity condition. The
answer to this question depends on what kind of Bayesian one is.
As I see it, there are two kinds of Bayesians: those who believe in the prior and
those who don’t. By “believe in the prior” I mean that one would actually bet based on
their prior probabilities, would effectively dismiss hypotheses with low prior probability,
and/or would be satisfied in evaluating the performance of their posterior distribution
with respect to the corresponding marginal distribution of Y , i.e., PY =
∫
PY |θ Π(dθ),
where Π is the prior distribution for θ. If one believes in the prior in this sense, then
a Bayesian validity property comes for free. That is, by Markov’s inequality and the
martingale property of the posterior with respect to the PY marginal,
PY {ΠY (A) > α−1Π(A)} ≤ α, for any α ∈ (0, 1) and any A. (7)
In words, the posterior probability being a large multiple of the prior probability is a rare
event with respect to PY . Is there anything more than a superficial similarity between the
inequalities in (7) and that in (3)? While there’s no notion of a hypothesis about θ being
“true” or “false” in this context, the closest thing is to consider those hypotheses with
small prior probability, since a believer in their prior probabilities would consider these to
be “effectively false.” Then (7) says that it’s rare to see data that provide strong support
for hypotheses having small prior probability, which is a version of the validity property.
These self-consistency properties are expected, that is, if the prior is meaningful, then
the posterior obtained by the usual probability calculus is equally meaningful.
The second group—those who don’t believe in the prior—consists of those Bayesians
who might, for simplicity, use default or non-informative priors, trusting that the prior-
to-posterior updates will correct for any shortcomings in the prior specification. In order
for the marginal distribution and the prior probabilities in (7) all make sense, let me
assume that the prior Π is proper but diffuse, as would often be the case in situations
where genuine prior information is lacking. It’s possible that PY could be very different
from the true distribution of Y , in which case (7) isn’t meaningful at all. But let me
also assume that PY is a reasonable approximation of the true distribution, e.g., it passes
certain prior- or posterior-predictive checks (e.g., Box 1980; Gelman et al. 1996; Rubin
1984). Even in this case, there is still trouble coming from (7). The inequality says that
the posterior probabilities are unlikely to be much larger than the prior probabilities. But
virtually any “non-extreme” hypothesis A has small Π(A) by virtue of the diffuse non-
informative prior, not because there’s reason to believe that it’s false. So if a potentially
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true hypothesis has small prior probability, and it’s unlikely that the posterior will be
much larger than the prior, then how can one expect to learn? This is precisely what’s
going on in the satellite conjunction analysis example summarized in Section 3.1. The
diffuse prior behind the scenes assigns small prior probability to the collision event and,
even if collision is imminent, (7) implies that the posterior probabilities are unlikely to
turn large, hence false confidence. So, the inequality (7) that is an asset to the Bayesian
who believes in his/her prior becomes a liability to the Bayesian who doesn’t.
6 Non-additive beliefs
6.1 Lower probabilities and capacities
In the previous sections I have argued that, at least in order to avoid false confidence, it is
necessary that the inferential model output be non-additive, e.g., that by(A) + by(A
c) 6= 1
for some hypothesis A. This section describe some particular non-additive set functions
that have been suggested in the literature as measures of degrees of belief, all of which
generalize the familiar additive probability. (Here it is not necessary to consider beliefs
that depend on data y so I will write b instead of by throughout.)
The most general non-additive measure considered here is a lower probability. Let Θ
be completely metrizable and consider a collection M of probability distributions on the
measurable space (Θ,BΘ). Now define the lower probability as
b(A) = inf
P∈M
P (A), A ∈ BΘ.
Of course, there is a dual to b, namely,
p(A) = sup
P∈M
P (A) = 1− b(Ac),
which in the this context is called the corresponding upper probability. The lower prob-
ability is non-additive in the sense above or, more specifically, they are super-additive in
the sense that
b(A ∪B) ≥ b(A) + b(B)− b(A ∩B),
with strict inequality at least for some A and B. Super-additivity implies that b(A) ≤
p(A), and this gap between the lower and upper probabilities can be understood as
a measure of how imprecise the imprecise model is; Dempster (2008) referred to the
difference p(A)−b(A) as the “don’t know” probability. Walley (1991) presents a theory of
imprecise probability based on lower probabilities—or, more generally, lower provisions—
with a focus on achieving a coherence, i.e., that a gambler who determines the prices she’s
willing to pay to make certain bets according to b can’t be made a sure loser. In fact, if
M is closed and convex, then the lower probability b is coherent (e.g., Walley 2000).
A special case of lower probabilities that often arises in statistical applications, namely,
in robustness studies, are Choquet capacities or, capacities for short (Choquet 1954). Let
b be a set function defined on a domain A ⊆ 2Θ, with the basic properties b(∅) = 0 and
b(Θ). Then b is a capacity of order n if
b(A) ≥
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|I|−1b
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
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for every A ∈ A and every collection {A1, . . . , An} of sets in A with Ai ⊂ A. Such a
function b is said to be n-monotone. Then the corresponding dual, p(A) = 1− b(Ac), is
n-alternating and satisfies
p(A) ≤
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|I|−1p
(⋃
i∈I
Ai
)
.
Since capacities are special cases of lower probabilities/provisions, it follows that they
too are super-additive. It is also clear that every capacity of order n is also a capacity of
order n − 1 so the class is shrinking in n. Therefore, capacities of order 2 are the most
general and have been investigated by statisticians in, e.g., Huber and Strassen (1973),
Huber (1973, 1981), Wasserman (1990), and Wasserman and Kadane (1990).
A relevant question is if there are any obvious practical advantages to super-additivity?
The answer is yes, and the simplest is that of modeling ignorance. Despite being some-
what extreme, ignorance is apparently a practically relevant case since the developments
of default priors are motivated by examples where the data analyst is ignorant about
the parameter, i.e., no genuine prior information is available. So, understanding how
to describe ignorance mathematically ought to be insightful for understanding the ad-
vantages and limitations of prior-free probabilistic inference. A first question is: what
does ignorance mean? A standard assumption is that the universe Θ is given—hence not
fully ignorant—and contains at least two points. Subject to these conditions, ignorance
means that there is no evidence available that supports the truthfulness or falsity of any
non-trivial hypothesis, and a natural way to encode this mathematically is by setting
b(A) = 0 for any proper subset A of Θ, and b(Θ) = 1. Shafer (1976) and others call this a
vacuous belief, and it’s easy to check that this b is super-additive. Compare this to stan-
dard approaches to formulating ignorance in classical probability, based on assumptions
of symmetry/invariance or Laplace’s “principle of indifference,” both of which are based
on certain judgments—or knowledge—and, therefore, don’t really model ignorance.
When working with ordinary probabilities, updating via conditioning is straightfor-
ward and uncontroversial. But the analogous updating of lower probabilities, capacities,
and even the belief functions discussed in Section 6.2 can have some arguably unex-
pected behaviors, e.g., dilation. See Gong and Meng (2017) for a modern discussion of
these updating rules and their respective properties. Some comments on Dempster’s rule
of combination (see, e.g., Shafer 1976) in the context of combining inferential models
represented as belief functions will be given in Section 8.2 below.
6.2 Belief functions
A belief function is a special type of capacity, one that is ∞-monotone, i.e., n-monotone
for all n ≥ 1. This is a strong condition, but there are some advantages that come with
this specialization, namely, that capacities are quite complicated but belief functions can
be characterized in terms of simpler and more intuitive mathematical objects.
As is customary in the literature on belief functions, I’ll assume for the moment that
Θ is a finite space. Then the power set 2Θ is also finite and I can imagine a probability
mass function m defined on 2Θ, assumed to satisfy m(∅) = 0. For A ⊆ Θ, the quantity
m(A) encodes the degree of belief in the truthfulness of A but in no proper subset of A.
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Then the function
b(A) =
∑
B:B⊆A
m(B), A ⊆ Θ, (8)
is a belief function, i.e., is a capacity of order∞. Intuitively, the belief in the truthfulness
of the assertion A is defined as the totality of the degrees of belief in A and all its proper
subsets. It turns out that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the mass function
m and the belief function b; see Shafer (1976) or Yager and Liu (2008) for details.
A further insight that can be gleaned from (8) is that the belief function is effectively
characterized by a random set. That is, one can think of m as the mass function for a
random element taking values in 2Θ. But this equivalence between belief functions and
random sets only holds up in the case when Θ is a finite set. When Θ is infinite, it
turns out that random sets corresponding to a special class of belief functions, which I
describe in the next subsection. To make the connection between random sets and belief
functions in the general case, there is an extra layer, what Shafer (1979) calls an allocation
of probability, which I will not discuss here. Kohlas and Monney (1995) also discuss this
gap between general belief functions and those based on random sets.
My discussion of belief functions here does nowhere near justice to the tremendous
amount of incredible work that has been done in this area. And since I can’t possibly
provide an adequate overview of the literature, let me just point the reader to the 2016
special issue13 of the International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, edited by Thierry
Denœux, to celebrate 40 years since publication of Glenn Shafer’s monograph, which
gives a look back at the belief function developments over that time.
6.3 Random sets
As eluded to in the previous subsection, random sets lead to belief functions but not all
belief functions correspond to random sets; the equivalence only holds when the domain
Θ is a finite set. In general, a random set on an infinite domain will inherit certain
continuity properties that a belief function need not satisfy.
As expected, defining random sets in a mathematically rigorous way requires con-
siderable care. Since this amount of rigor isn’t necessary—or helpful—for my present
purposes, I will not be completely precise in what follows. The reader interested in the
precise details can check out Nguyen (1978, 2006) or Molchanov (2005). Let T denote a
random set in Θ, i.e., a (measurable) function from a sample space to 2Θ. If PT is the
distribution of T , define the containment functional
c(A) = PT (T ⊆ A), A ⊆ Θ.
This containment functional obviously satisfies c(∅) = 0 and c(Θ) = 1. It can also be
shown that c is ∞-monotone, so c is a belief function. However, through its connection
to a genuine probability measure, c is also continuous in the sense that
c(An) ↓ c(A), for any An ↓ A,
a condition which is not required of general belief functions. Interestingly, the additional
layer that Shafer needed to connect belief functions to random sets is entirely due to the
13https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/international-journal-of-approximate-reasoning/
special-issue/10BG01ZSM7P
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latter being continuous. Indeed, according to the famous Choquet capacity theorem, every
continuous belief is the capacity functional of a random set. In Section 7, I will describe
the construction of a valid inferential model whose output is a random set containment
function, hence is equivalent to a framework built around continuous belief functions.
An even more specific class of belief functions is that based on random sets, T which
are nested in the sense that, for any pair of sets T and T ′ in the support of T , either
T ⊆ T ′ or T ⊇ T ′. Then the corresponding belief function, b, is called consonant, and
the dual, p, to b has the following surprising property:
p(A) = sup
ϑ∈Θ
p({ϑ}).
That is, the plausibility and, hence, the belief function are determined by an ordinary
point function, called the plausibility contour,
p({ϑ}) = PT (T 3 ϑ), ϑ ∈ Θ.
The belief/plausibility functions corresponding to nested random sets are also known as
necessity/possibility measures (e.g., Dubois and Prade 1988).
7 Valid inferential models
7.1 Basic construction
The previous sections have focused primarily on the point that non-additive degrees of
belief satisfying a validity constraint (or something similar) are needed in order to avoid
false confidence. Obvious questions that come to mind are does a valid inferential model
exist? and, if so, how to construct it? This section reviews the detailed construction first
presented in Martin and Liu (2013) and then expanded upon in Martin and Liu (2016).
The inferential model depends explicitly on the posited statistical model, so the start-
ing point for the following construction is a particular representation of that model, as a
data-generating process. That is, write
Y = a(θ, U), U ∼ PU , (9)
where U ∈ U is called an auxiliary variable with distribution PU fully known, and
a : Θ × U → Y is a known mapping. The representation in (9) is called an associa-
tion between data Y , parameter θ, and auxiliary variable U . An association always exists
since any sampling model that can be simulated on a computer must have a represen-
tation (9), but that representation is not unique. The association need not be based on
knowledge of the actual data-generating process, it can be viewed simply as a represen-
tation of the data analyst’s uncertainty; that is, no claim that U exists in “real life” is
made or required. The advantage to introducing U in (9) is that it identifies a fixed
probability space, namely, (U,B,PU), for a σ-algebra B, on which we are free to carry
out probability calculations independent of the data and parameter; as I describe below,
these “probability calculations” are with respect to the distribution of a random set on
U.
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Readers familiar with Fisher’s fiducial argument, or the structural inference frame-
work of Fraser (1968), will recognize the auxiliary variable U as a “pivotal quantity.”
Roughly speaking, these approaches aim to solve the equation (9) for θ and then use the
distribution U ∼ PU and the observed value of Y to induce a distribution for θ. This
fiducial argument will lead to an additive probability distribution on Θ which does not
satisfy the validity property. Even the extended fiducial argument put forth by Dempster,
where the inferential output need not be additive, the validity property generally fails.
Therefore, something extra is needed. More discussion on the connection between the
fiducial argument and the approach presented here is given in Section 8.1.
According to the formulation in (9), there is a quantity U that, together with θ,
determines the value of Y . If both Y and U were observable, then (9) could be simply
solved for θ, hence the best possible inference. That is, if Y = y and U = u were observed,
then it would be certain that the true θ belongs to the set
Θy(u) = {ϑ ∈ Θ : y = a(ϑ, u)}.
However, since U is not observable, the best one can do is to accurately predict14 the
unobserved value using some information about its distribution PU .
To accurately predict the specific unobserved value of U , it is not enough to use
an independent draw from PU as the fiducial argument suggests. Intuitively, hitting a
target with positive probability requires stretching that draw from PU into a genuine set.
Towards formalizing this notion of “stretching a draw from PU ,” consider a random set,
S, having distribution PS , with the property that it contains a large PU -proportion of U
values with high probability. More precisely, define γS(u) = PS(S 3 u), a feature of the
distribution PS , called the contour function of S, and suppose that
γS(U) is stochastically no smaller than Unif(0, 1). (10)
In other words, S—or, rather, PS—must be such that
PU{γS(U) ≤ α} ≤ α, ∀ α ∈ [0, 1].
Intuitively, this condition suggests that S can cover a draw U from PU with high prob-
ability. Martin and Liu (2013) demonstrate that this is a relatively mild condition and
provide some general strategies for constructing such a set S. For example, if PU is non-
atomic and h : U → R is a continuous function, non-constant on any set with positive
PU -measure, then h(U) is a continuous random variable and the random set
S := {u ∈ U : h(u) ≤ h(U˜)}, U˜ ∼ PU , (11)
satisfies (10); see Martin and Liu (2016, p. 61) for a proof. One case that arises in a
number of examples is where U = [0, 1] and PU = Unif(0, 1), and a “default” choice of S
is like that given above, with h(u) = |u− 1
2
|, that is,
S = {u ∈ (0, 1) : |u− 0.5| ≤ |U − 0.5|}, U ∼ Unif(0, 1). (12)
14Perhaps guess is a better word to describe this operation than predict but the former has a particularly
non-scientific connotation, which I’d like to avoid.
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Now, if S provides a reliable guess of where the unobserved U resides, in the sense of
(10), then an equally reliable guess of where the unknown θ resides, given Y = y, is
Θy(S) =
⋃
u∈S
Θy(u),
another random set, with distribution determined by PS . It is, therefore, natural to say
that data y supports the claim “θ ∈ A” if Θy(S) is a subset of A. Then the inferential
model output is
by(A) = PS{Θy(S) ⊆ A}, A ⊆ Θ. (13)
This is a belief function, like in Section 6.2, so it inherits those properties, e.g., it’s
super-additive and has a corresponding plausibility function py(A) = 1− by(Ac).
It will typically be the case that Θy(S) is nested, as discussed in Section 6.3; I’ll talk
about why in Section 8.2. Consequently, the belief function by is consonant and fully
determined by the plausibility contour py({ϑ}) = PS{Θy(S) 3 ϑ}, ϑ ∈ Θ. According to
Shafer (1976, Ch. 10), while the use of a consonant belief function as a description of
evidence might be questionable in general, one case where it would be appropriate is in
describing inferential evidence, as is the focus here.
Next are a couple simple examples to illustrate the construction and the corresponding
belief/plausibility function evaluation.
Example 1. Let Y be a scalar with continuous distribution function Fθ, depending on a
scalar parameter θ. Then a natural choice for the association (9) would be Y = F−1θ (U),
where U ∼ Unif(0, 1). Then Θy(u) = {ϑ : Fϑ(y) = u} and, with a random set S, it is
easy to check that Θy(S) = {ϑ : S 3 Fϑ(y)}, so
py({ϑ}) = PS{S 3 Fϑ(y)}.
Using the default random set S in (12), this can be simplified:
py({ϑ}) = 1− |2Fϑ(y)− 1|.
From here, plausibility of any hypothesis A can be evaluated as
ply(A) = sup
ϑ∈A
ply({ϑ}),
and hence belief can be evaluated according to the formula by(A) = 1 − py(Ac). For
example, suppose that Fθ is the distribution function of Gamma(θ, 1), where θ > 0 is
the unknown shape parameter. Panel (a) in Figure 3 shows the plausibility contour and
Panel (b) shows by(Aϑ) and py(Aϑ) where Aϑ = (0, ϑ), sort of lower and upper distribution
functions. Note the gap between the lower and upper in Panel (b).
Example 2. Consider a binomial model, Y ∼ Bin(n, θ), where n is a known positive
integer and θ ∈ (0, 1) is the unknown success probability. Despite its apparent simplicity,
inference on θ in the binomial model is far from trivial (e.g., Brown et al. 2001). In this
case, the most natural version of (9) is
Fθ(Y − 1) ≤ U < Fθ(Y ), U ∼ Unif(0, 1),
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Figure 3: Results of the gamma inference problem in Example 1 with Y = 7. Panel (a)
shows the plausibility contour and Panel (b) shows the belief and plausibility functions
for the collection of hypotheses Aϑ = (0, ϑ).
where Fθ is the Bin(n, θ) distribution function. There is no simple equation linking
(Y, θ, U) in this case, just a rule “Y = a(θ, U)” for producing Y with given θ and U . This
determines the map u 7→ Θy(u), which is given by
Θy(u) = {ϑ : Fϑ(y − 1) ≤ u < Fϑ(y)}
= {ϑ : Gn−y+1,y(1− ϑ) ≤ u < Gn−y,y+1(1− ϑ)}
= {ϑ : 1−G−1n−y+1,y(u) ≤ ϑ < 1−G−1n−y,y+1(u)},
where Ga,b denotes the Beta(a, b) distribution function. This calculation follows from
the connection between the binomial and beta distribution functions, namely, Fθ(y) =
Gn−y,y+1(1 − θ), which can be derived using integration-by-parts. Note that, in this
discrete-data setting, the set Θy(u) is an interval, not a singleton like in the continuous-
data example above. Next, for simplicity, again I’ll use the default random set S in (12)
for predicting the unobserved U ∼ Unif(0, 1). Combining S with Θy(·) above gives
Θy(S) =
⋃
u∈S
Θy(u) =
[
1−G−1n−y+1,y(12 + |U˜ − 12 |), 1−G−1n−y,y+1(12 − |U˜ − 12 |)
]
,
where U˜ ∼ Unif(0, 1). Then the probability, PS{Θy(S) ⊂ A} can be computed for any A
using the distribution of the endpoints of Θy(S), which are simple functions of a uniform
random variable. For example, the plausibility contour equals
py({ϑ}) = PS{Θy(S) 3 ϑ} = 1− PS{max Θy(S) < ϑ} − PS{min Θy(S) > ϑ}.
The expression for this is messy, but the computation is easy. Figure 4(a) shows a plot
of this plausibility contour based on and observed y = 7 and n = 18. A feature that
distinguishes this plausibility contour from that in Example 1 is the plateau at the top;
this is a consequence of Θy(u) being an interval for all u, which itself is a consequence
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Figure 4: Results of the binomial inference problem in Example 2 with y = 7 and n = 18.
Panel (a) shows the plausibility contour and Panel (b) shows the belief and plausibility
functions for the collection of hypotheses Aϑ = (0, ϑ).
of the discreteness of Y . Panel (b) shows the belief and plausibility for a sequence of
one-sided hypotheses like that in Figure 3(b).
Importantly, the inferential model obtained by the above construction, driven by the
random set S ∼ PS that satisfies (10), is provably valid in the sense of Definition 2.
Theorem 3 (Martin and Liu 2013). Suppose that S satisfies (10) and that Θy(S) is
non-empty with PS-probability 1 for each y. Then the inferential model with output by
defined in (13) is valid in the sense of Definition 2.
Recall that the validity condition was designed to properly calibrate the data analyst’s
beliefs for scientific application, to avoid false confidence. An important practical conse-
quence, presented in Theorem 2 above, is that it’s straightforward to construct decision
procedures with guaranteed frequentist error rate control. For example, the corresponding
plausibility region (5) attains the nominal frequentist coverage probability.
The non-emptiness assumption in the theorem often holds automatically for natural
choices of S, but can fail if the dimensions of θ and U don’t match up (see Section 7.2) or
in problems that involve non-trivial parameter constraints. When PS{Θx(S) 6= ∅} < 1,
Ermini Leaf and Liu (2012) propose to use an elastic version of S that stretches just
enough that Θy(S) is non-empty, and they prove a corresponding validity theorem.
To conclude this brief introduction, I should mention that the approach described
above is not necessarily the only way to construct a valid inferential model. I’m currently
not aware of any competing constructions, but I make no claims that what I’ve presented
above is the best or only way to achieve the desired validity property.
7.2 Dimension reduction
The basic construction presented above is actually quite general, but depending on the
data structure and/or the objectives of the analysis, it may be possible to make the
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inferential model more efficient by reducing the dimension of the auxiliary variable that
links the data and parameter in (9). This dimension reduction strategy has proved to be
useful in two frequently encountered scenarios:
• when data consists of individual components each contributing some information
about a common parameter, e.g., like with iid data, and
• when the parameter of interest is some lower-dimensional feature, φ = φ(θ), of the
full parameter θ.
I’ll give a brief summary of the general ideas here, saving details for the examples in
Section 7.3; see, also, Martin and Liu (2016, Ch. 6–7) and the relevant references.
Consider the case of iid data, Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn). There are two obvious ways to
proceed. The first is to develop an association of the form (9) with U = (U1, . . . , Un), an
auxiliary variable for every data point, introduce a random set for the n-dimensional U ,
and proceed as above. The second is to construct valid inferential models with output
byi for each i = 1, . . . , n, and than combine—since they are all independent and carry
information about the same θ—combine them in some way, e.g., using Dempster’s rule
of combination. It turns out that neither of these two obvious approaches are most
efficient; see Section 8.2. The key insight, first presented in Martin and Liu (2015a), is
that if information about θ is coming from multiple sources, then there will features of
the unobservable auxiliary variable U = (U1, . . . , Un) that actually are observed, hence
no reason to predict those features with a random set. The strategy is to express U in a
coordinate system in wherein some coordinates are observed and the others are not. This
is done by identifying a one-to-one mapping u 7→ (τ(u), η(u)), where η(u) corresponds
to the observable part and τ(u) the unobservable part. Then τ(U) will necessarily be
of lower dimension than U itself, so predicting τ(U) with a suitable random set will be
easier and more efficient than predicting the full U . There are a number of strategies
available to identify the (τ, η) mapping—using sufficient statistics, symmetry/invariance,
a conditional representation of the statistical model, solving a differential equation, etc.—
and I will illustrate these different approaches in the examples that follow.
Next, assuming that the combination steps have been carried out, so that the auxiliary
variable U is currently of the same dimension as that of the parameter θ, if the goal is
inference on φ = φ(θ), then there may be an opportunity to reduce the dimension of the
auxiliary variable further. In the simplest case, imagine that some feature of U is directly
connected to data and φ, while the remaining features of U don’t directly connect to φ.
Martin and Liu (2015b) show that one can effectively ignore the part of U unrelated to
φ, and predict only that relevant feature of U . Again, that feature would be of dimension
lower than that of the original U , hence an opportunity for improved efficiency. Examples
below will illustrate this. Being able to isolate the interest parameter φ in the association
is not always possible, it depends on the structure of the model, but there are strategies
that may work even if the isolation is not strictly possible; see Section 7.3.3.
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7.3 Examples
7.3.1 Two normal means
Consider two independent normal samples, i.e.,
Y11, . . . , Y1n1
iid∼ N(µ1, σ2) and Y21, . . . , Y2n2 iid∼ N(µ2, σ2), (14)
where the means, µ1 and µ2, and the sample sizes, n1 and n2, are possibly different,
but the variance σ2 is assumed to be the same in both groups; the more general case is
considered in Section 7.3.3. The full parameter in this case is θ = (µ1, µ2, σ), but the
goal is only to determine if there is a difference between the two group means, a common
marginal inference problem.
As a first step, according to the general results in Martin and Liu (2015a), reduce the
dimension of the problem down via sufficient statistics. Then the relevant association is
µˆ1 = µi + σn
−1/2
1 U1,
µˆ2 = µ2 + σn
−1/2
2 U2,
σˆ2 = σ2(n1 + n2 − 2)−1U3,
where µˆ1 and µˆ2 are the group sample means, σˆ
2 is the usual pooled sample variance,
U1 and U2 are independent standard normals, and U3 is an independent chi-square with
n1 + n2 − 2 degrees of freedom. Interest is in φ = µ1 − µ2 and manipulating the above
association in an obvious way gives
φˆ = φ+ σˆ
n
−1/2
1 U1 + n
−1/2
2 U2√
(n1 + n2 − 2)−1U3
µˆ2 = µ2 + σn
−1/2
2 U2,
σˆ2 = σ2(n1 + n2 − 2)−1U3,
where φˆ = µˆ1−µˆ2. The latter two equations do not directly involve the interest parameter
φ, so if the goal is marginal inference on φ, I have no need to predict U2 and U3, so these
can be ignored. And that particular feature of (U1, U2, U3) in the first equation has a
known distribution, namely, a Student-t distribution with n1 +n2−2 degrees of freedom.
So if F denotes that distribution function, then the marginal association for φ can be
written as
φˆ = φ+ σˆ(n−11 + n
−1
2 )
1/2 F−1(W ), W ∼ Unif(0, 1). (15)
If I now introduce the default random set S in (12), which is optimal in this case, then I
get a corresponding random set for φ,
Φx(S) = {ϕ : wy(ϕ) ∈ S},
where wy(ϕ) is the solution of (15) for given data “y” and generic ϕ value, i.e.,
wy(ϕ) = F
( φˆ− ϕ
σˆ{n−11 + n−12 }1/2
)
.
Then the plausibility is given by a probability with respect to the distribution PS of the
random set S:
py({ϕ}) = PS{Φy(S) 3 ϕ} = 1−
∣∣2wy(ϕ)− 1∣∣. (16)
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(a) φˆ = 0.5 and σˆ = 1.25.
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(b) φˆ = 1 and σˆ = 0.75.
Figure 5: Plots of the plausibility contour from Section 7.3.1 for the two cases and for
the two sample size configurations in each case, all on the same scale.
For illustration, I consider two (φˆ, σˆ) cases, one small signal-large noise and one large
signal-small noise. For simplicity of comparison only, I assume that n1 = n2 = n, and I
consider n = 5 and n = 10 for each of the two cases above. Figure 5 shows the plausibility
contour py({ϕ}) for the two cases and two sample size configurations.
First, in all four cases, the plausibility contour peaks at the estimate φˆ, and decays
symmetrically as ϕ moves farther from φˆ. The interpretation is that the most likely value,
the point estimator, is fully plausible—which is why it’s used as an estimate—but values
distant from the estimate should be less plausible. Second, the more informative the data
are, either because σˆ is smaller or because the sample size is larger, the more narrow the
plausibility curve is. This, again, agrees with the intuition that more informative data
leads to more precise inference, i.e., a more narrow range of plausible values.
What is especially interesting about the plausibility function plots in Figure 5 is
that the data analyst can immediately read off the answer to virtually any relevant
question. First, using the horizontal reference line at 0.05, one can easily identify the
95% plausibility interval for φ as the set of all ϕ with point plausibility at least 0.05.
Naturally, more informative data makes the interval narrower. And the interpretation is
clear: if a value, such as ϕ = 0 is in the plausibility interval, then it is sufficiently plausible
based on the data, otherwise it’s not. Note also that the plausibility function is on the
appropriate scale for reading off these intervals; compare this to a Bayesian approach
where the need to evaluate tail areas via integration makes it impossible to read off the
credible interval from a plot of the posterior density. Of course, there is nothing sacred
about 0.05, one is free to set their own threshold for “sufficiently implausible.”
Second, since interest is in comparing the group means, a relevant hypothesis is A =
(−∞, 0). The reference line at ϕ = 0 is helpful in this assessment. In Panel (a), for
example, with n = 5 (black line), I find that py({0}) is between 0.5 and 0.6; the precise
value is 0.545. Therefore, since the point plausibility is increasing up to ϕ = 0, I get
py(A) = 0.545 and by(A) = 0, so no definitive judgment can be made about the hypothesis
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A because belief is small but plausibility is not small. Virtually the same conclusion
would be reached in the slightly more informative case with n = 10. On the other hand,
in Panel (b), with n = 10 (gray line), py({0}) is effectively 0, so both by(A) and py(A)
are very small, so I can infer Ac, i.e., the hypothesis {φ < 0} = {µ1 < µ2} is sufficiently
implausible based on the data.
7.3.2 Normal coefficient of variation, cont.
Reconsider the normal coefficient of variation example from Section 3.2. Following the
general theory, take the minimal sufficient statistic (µˆ, σˆ2), the sample mean and sample
variance, respective, and build the association in terms of these:
µˆ = µ+ σn−1/2U1, U1 ∼ N(0, 1),
σˆ2 = σ2U2, U2 ∼ (n− 1)−1ChiSq(n− 1),
where U1 and U2 are independent. The parameter of interest, φ = σ/µ, is a scalar but
the auxiliary variable (U1, U2) is two-dimensional, so we would like to further reduce the
dimension of the latter. An argument similar to that in Section 7.3.1 leads to a (marginal)
association for the interest parameter φ:
n1/2φˆ−1 = F−1n,φ−1(W ), W ∼ Unif(0, 1),
where φˆ = σˆ/µˆ and Fn,ψ is the non-central Student-t distribution function, with n − 1
degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter n1/2ψ. Different random sets S for
the unobserved W may be considered (see below) but, for now, I’ll consider that same
“default” choice in (12). The calculation in Example 1 leads to a plausibility contour
py({ϕ}) = 1− |2Fn,ϕ−1(n−1φˆ−1)− 1|. (17)
Since the random set is nested, the derived belief function is consonant and, hence, this
plausibility contour fully determines the inferential model output.
For given α ∈ (0, 1), the 100(1− α)% plausibility region for φ is given by
{ϕ : py({ϕ}) > α} = {ϕ : α/2 < Fn,ϕ−1(n1/2φˆ−1) < 1− α/2}.
One can check directly that this plausibility region has coverage probability 1 − α, but
it follows as a consequence of Theorem 2. The Gleser–Hwang theorem applies to these
plausibility regions, so having the nominal frequentist coverage implies that these will be
unbounded with positive probability; see Figure 6, which shows two plausibility contours,
one that vanishes in the tails, yielding bounded plausibility intervals, and one that does
not. Of course, unbounded regions are perfectly reasonable in this problem: given the
inherent variability of the sample mean around µ, if µ is close to zero, then arbitrarily
large values of φ cannot be ruled out.
Next, I revisit the simulation from Section 3.2. Recall that Y consists of n = 10 iid
observations from N(µ, σ2), with µ = 0.1 and σ = 1, so that φ = 10 is the true value.
Then I consider a false hypothesis A = (−∞, 9]. Here I want to compare the distribution
of the belief function bY (A) from above, as a function of Y , with that of the posterior
distribution ΠY (A) from before. Figure 7 shows the same distribution function of ΠY (A)
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Figure 6: Plots of the plausibility function for φ = σ/µ based on samples of size n = 30
from N(µ, σ2) for σ = 1 and two values of µ.
as in Figure 2, and also shows two other distribution functions: one for the belief function
bY (A) based on the inferential model construction laid out above; the other for the belief
function based on the same formulation but with a “better” random set, namely, the
one-sided interval S = [W˜ , 1], with W˜ ∼ Unif(0, 1), suggested by Theorem 4 in Martin
and Liu (2013). Both of the latter distribution functions stay above the diagonal line,
because they’re both valid, while the Bayes version falls below and, hence, is not valid.
That the one belief has distribution function closer to the diagonal line, without going
below, is a sign of added efficiency; see Section 8.2. The takeaway message is that it’s
possible to construct valid (and even efficient) degrees of belief in this difficult problem,
but non-additivity is essential.
7.3.3 Behrens–Fisher problem
The so-called Behrens–Fisher problem is a fundamental one, a generalization of the prob-
lem in Section 7.3.1 where the two groups have their own unknown variances. Despite its
apparent simplicity, it turns out that the only “exact” procedures are those that depend
on the order in which the data is processed, which is not fully satisfactory. Standard
solutions are given by Hsu (1938) and Scheffe´ (1970); see, also, Welch (1938, 1947). For
a review, see Kim and Cohen (1998), Ghosh and Kim (2001), and Fraser et al. (2009).
Consider the model in (14), but where the two groups have their own unknown vari-
ance, σ21 and σ
2
2, respectively. Reduction via sufficiency leads to a baseline association
µˆk = µk + σk n
−1/2
k U1k, and σˆk = σkU2k, k = 1, 2, (18)
where U1k ∼ N(0, 1) and (nk − 1)U22k ∼ ChiSq(nk − 1), independent, for k = 1, 2. Define
f(σ1, σ2) = (σ
2
1/n1 + σ
2
2/n2)
1/2 and note that (18) can be re-expressed as
φˆ = φ+ f(σ1, σ2)V and σˆk = σkU2k, k = 1, 2, V ∼ N(0, 1). (19)
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Figure 7: Plot of the distribution function Gθ(α) = PY |θ{bY (A) ≤ α} of the Bayesian
posterior probability (gray), the valid inferential model (black, solid) with plausibility
contour in (17), and the one based on the “better” random set (dashed), where A =
(−∞, 9] is a false hypothesis about the coefficient φ = σ/µ when µ = 0.1 and σ = 1.
Plug in σˆk = σkU2k for k = 1, 2, to get
φˆ− φ
f(σˆ1, σˆ2)
=
f(σ1, σ2)
f(σ1U21, σ2U22)
V, and σˆk = σkU2k, k = 1, 2. (20)
If the coefficient on V was free of (σ1, σ2), it would be straightforward to marginalize to an
association in terms of φ only, by ignoring the nuisance parameter components. However,
this simple approach is not possible in this challenging problem. As an alternative, Martin
and Liu (2015b) suggest a strategy in which the nuisance parameter components can
be ignored but that the distribution of the auxiliary variable is stretched accordingly.
Skipping the details, they suggest a new dimension-reduced association for φ,
φˆ− φ
f(σˆ1, σˆ2)
= G−1(W ), W ∼ Unif(0, 1),
where G is the distribution function of a Student-t distribution with max(n1, n2)− 1 de-
grees of freedom. Here, because of symmetry, the default random set S in (12) is optimal,
and the plausibility contour can be evaluated exactly as in Example 1 above. Moreover,
this generalized marginal inferential model is valid, which leads to an alternative proof
of the conservative coverage properties of the Hsu–Scheffe´ confidence interval.
Data on travel times from home to work for two different routes are presented by
Lehmann (1975, p. 83), summarized below:
(n1, µˆ1, σˆ
2
1) = (5, 7.58, 2.24) and (n2, µˆ2, σˆ
2
2) = (11, 6.14, 0.07).
The goal is to investigate the difference between the mean travel times for the two routes.
Figure 8 shows the plausibility contour and along with the horizontal cut at α = 0.05
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Figure 8: Plot of the plausibility contour for the example in Section 7.3.3. Horizontal
line at α = 0.05 determines the 95% plausibility region for φ.
that determines the 95% plausibility interval for φ. As expected, the contour has a peak
at the estimated mean difference, φˆ = 1.44, but the fact that py({0}) exceeds 0.05 implies
that the two routes having the same mean travel times is sufficiently plausible.
7.3.4 Two Poisson rates
Consider two independent Poisson samples, Y1 ∼ Pois(n1θ1) and Y2 ∼ Pois(n2θ2), where
the “sample sizes” n1 and n2 are known but the rates θ = (θ1, θ2) are unknown. The
quantity of interest here is φ = θ1/θ2, the ratio. Inference on φ has been explored in
a number of papers, including Krishnamoorthy and Thomson (2004) and the references
therein. A similar problem arises in Jin et al. (2016), and I employed a conditioning
strategy like the one below in Martin (2018, Sec. 5).
The jumping off point is the realization that there are two data points—each with a
corresponding auxiliary variables—but only a scalar interest parameter. So reducing the
dimension before building the inferential model would be advantageous. One dimension-
reduction strategy that can sometimes be employed is based on conditioning. Here the
approach is relatively straightforward and familiar. That is, the conditional distribution
of Y2, given Y1 + Y2 = k, is binomial with parameters k and
g(φ) =
n2θ2
n1θ1 + n2θ2
= {1 + (n1/n2)φ}−1,
a one-to-one function of φ. So I just have to build an association in terms of the marginal
distribution for Y1 + Y2 and also in terms of the aforementioned conditional. Each will
have an associated auxiliary variable but I will just ignore the one in the marginal part,
focusing only on the association that describes the conditional distribution, which only
involves the interest parameter. And, fortunately, that analysis based on the conditional
distribution is almost identical to that presented in Example 2 above. The only point of
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Figure 9: Plot of the plausibility contour for the ratio φ = θ1/θ2 of Poisson means based
on the data as described in Example 7.3.4.
departure is the transformation between the binomial parameter g(φ) and φ, but this is
not a problem. Here, however, I will also consider a random set other than the default
considered in all the examples so far. In particular, I will use the greedy random set
construction laid out in Martin et al. (2012) which, unfortunately, is too complicated to
describe here; my reason for doing so is to illustrate what an efficient inferential model
looks like in a discrete problem; see, also, Section 8.4 below.
As an illustration, suppose a builder purchases lumber from both Company 1 and
Company 2. Whenever the lumber is delivered, a sample is taken and inspected and, in
the most recent deliveries, a sample of n1 = 30 samples was taken from Company 1’s lot
and y1 = 2 defectives were identified, while n2 = 35 samples from Company 2’s delivery
yielded y2 = 4 defectives. Using the conditional-binomial formulation described above,
with random set construction as in Martin et al. (2012), I get the plausibility contour for
φ in Figure 9. One might guess that these data can’t distinguish between the two lumber
suppliers in terms of their defective rates, and the plausibility contour plot confirms this
since the plausibility at ϕ = 1 is rather high. What’s especially interesting about the
plot is that it’s not smooth, there are both plateaus and corners. My experience is that
“good” random sets for discrete data problems will yield plausibility contours with this
shape, but a clear understanding of this phenomenon is still lacking.
7.3.5 Fre´chet shape
Suppose that data Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) are iid from a unit Fre´chet distribution with shape
parameter θ > 0; usually there are location and scale parameters included but I’m leaving
these out here only for simplicity. The Fre´chet distribution is max-stable and, therefore,
is a canonical model in extreme value theory (e.g., de Haan and Ferreira 2006). It’s
also a challenging problem because it lacks the nice exponential family structure that
guarantees existence of a one-dimensional sufficient statistic. So combining the different
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sources of information about θ in this case requires some non-standard techniques.
To construct a valid inferential model, first recall that the distribution function for
the Fre´chet model is given by
Fθ(y) = exp(−y−θ), y > 0,
and so this model can be described via an association
Yi = (− logUi)−1/θ, i = 1, . . . , n, (21)
where U1, . . . , Un are iid Unif(0, 1) and the expression on the right-hand side above is
just the solution F−1θ (u) of the equation u = Fθ(y). As I hinted in Section 7.2, in such
cases there will be features of the auxiliary variable that are fully observed, and that
identifying those features—and suitably conditioning on them—is important for reducing
the dimension and increasing the efficiency of the inferential model. One might be able
to guess directly what kind of features are observed (see below), but let me proceed with
a formal construction which I think is informative.
The jumping off point is the observation that, if uy,θ is a solution to the system (21),
then those features, η(uy,θ), that don’t vary with θ would correspond to observed features
of U . So then the goal would be to find a function η that satisfies the following partial
differential equation:
∂η(uy,θ)
∂θ
= 0.
Presently, it is unknown what problems will admit a differential equation that has a solu-
tion, but there are examples where solving this is possible, and there are other examples
(see Section ?? below) where some change-of-perspective is required in order to find a
solution. For the present case with n iid samples, it makes sense to use the chain rule
and re-express this differential equation as
∂η(u)
∂u
∣∣∣
u=uy,θ
· ∂uy,θ
∂θ
= 0, (22)
where ∂uy,θ/∂θ is a n-vector that is easy to compute from the known form of uy,θ, and
∂η(u)/∂u is a matrix with n columns and of rank n − 1. That is, η is a map from the
n-space of u’s to some (n− 1)-dimensional subspace.
Solving the above differential equation can proceed in various ways; techniques that
I’ve found to be successful are guess-and-check and the method of characteristics (e.g.,
Polyanin et al. 2002) and here I’ll illustrate the latter. Write mθ(u) for ∂uy,θ/∂θ with
y = a(θ, u) plugged in, so that it’s only a function of θ and u. In the present example,
mθ(u) = θ
−1u log u log(− log u), u ∈ (0, 1).
Then the method of characteristics suggests solving the following (nonparametric) system
of ordinary differential equations:
du1
mθ(u1)
=
du2
mθ(u2)
= · · · = dun
mθ(un)
.
The solution to such a system of equations looks like
zθ(u1) = zθ(u2) + c1 = · · · = zθ(un) + cn−1
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for constants c1, . . . , cn−1, where dzθ(u)/du = mθ(u)−1. In the present example,
zθ(u) =
∫
mθ(u)
−1 du = θ
∫
1
u log u log(− log u) du,
which, upon making a change-of-variable, s = log(− log u), yields an anti-derivative
zθ(u) = θ log | log(− log u)|.
The constants c1, . . . , cn−1 are intended to accommodate the rank constraint on the deriva-
tive of η, and suggests a sort of “location constraint” on the zθ(ui)’s, so that the final
solution is a function of the differences zθ(ui)− zθ(uj). That is, take
η(u) = M zθ(u),
where zθ(u) = (zθ(u1), . . . , zθ(un))
> and M a matrix with constant vectors in its null
space, so that the rows of M are like contrasts. Note that θ appearing as a multiplicative
constant in zθ(u) can be ignored here, so that η(u) only depends on u. From this final
expression, it is easy to see that η satisfies the above differential equation.
In this particular example, the differences zθ(ui)−zθ(uj) are proportional to the loga-
rithm of the ratio log(− log ui)/ log(− log uj), which is easily seen to be equal to the ratio
log yi/ log yj. Therefore, the feature η(u) constructed above is observable, as intended.
The reader experienced with properties of the Fre´chet distribution might have been able
to anticipate this form of η from the beginning, but I think this formal construction is
still interesting and informative.
To keep things simple here, let me consider only the n = 2 case. Then I can simplify
the final result above and take
η(u) = log(− log u2)/ log(− log u1).
I need another mapping, τ , to complement η, and a suitable choice here is τ(u) =
log(− log u1). This leads to a re-expressed “dimension-reduced” association
T (Y ) = θ−1V1 and H(Y ) = V2,
where T (Y ) = − log Y1, H(Y ) = log Y2/ log Y1, V1 = τ(U), and V2 = η(U). It is straight-
forward to find the conditional distribution of V1, given V2 = h, where h is the observed
value of H(Y ), and then define a random set, S, designed to predict draws from this
conditional distribution. That is, if gh is the density for the aforementioned conditional
distribution, then a very reasonable—perhaps “optimal”—random set is
S = {v1 : gh(v1) ≥ gh(V˜1)}, V˜1 ∼ gh.
With that the plausibility contour can be evaluated, via Monte Carlo, as
py({ϑ}) ≈ 1
K
K∑
k=1
1{gh(V˜ (k)1 ) ≥ gh(ϑT (y))}, V˜ (k)1 iid∼ gh.
A plot of this plausibility contour, based on a pair of samples (n = 2) from Fθ with θ = 2,
is shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Plausibility contour for the Fre´chet example; n = 2, true θ = 2.
7.3.6 Non-regular cube-root normal
Consider the following cube-root normal problem,
Y1 = θ + U1 and Y2 = θ
1/3 + U2,
where (U1, U2) consists fo two iid N(0, 1) random variables, and the goal is inference on
θ. This example was considered in Seidenfeld (1992) for comparing fiducial and Bayes
updates, and more recently in Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2017). There’s two observations
carrying information about the same θ, so there is an opportunity to reduce the dimension
of the auxiliary variable to match that of the parameter. No such reduction is provided
by sufficiency in this non-regular example, but the differential equation strategy can be
applied here to reduce the dimension.
Write uy,θ for the solution of the above system when y and θ are fixed:
uy,θ = (y1 − θ, y2 − θ1/3)>.
As before, the goal is to find η(u) to solve the differential equation(∂η(u)
∂u
∣∣∣
u=uy,θ
)>∂uy,θ
∂θ
= 0.
Unfortunately, it may not be possible to find a solution to this differential equation that
doesn’t depend on θ. But there’s a way to get around this obstacle based on an idea of
localization first presented in Martin and Liu (2015a). Let ηϑ(u) be a function like before,
depending on some generic parameter value ϑ. Localization requires that we solve the
following differential equation:
∂ηϑ(uy,θ)
∂θ
= 0 when θ = ϑ.
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With this additional flexibility, the equation can be solved:
ηϑ(u) = ϑ
2/3u2 − 13u1.
Now pair this ηϑ with a function τ such that u 7→ (τ(u), ηϑ(u)) is one-to-one for each
ϑ. Here I will take τ(u) = u1. There is corresponding pair of functions (T,Hϑ) on the
Y -space, defined as
T (y) = y1 and Hϑ(y) = ηϑ(uy,ϑ) = 3ϑ
2/3(y2 − ϑ1/3)− (y1 − ϑ).
Write out a “dimension-reduced” association
T (Y ) = θ + τ(U) and Hϑ(Y ) = ηϑ(U).
The first equation depends on θ while the other does not. This suggests writing V1 = τ(U)
and V2 = ηϑ(U) and using the conditional distribution of V1, given the observed value
hϑ = Hϑ(y1, y2) of V2. Of course, this conditional distribution is normal and can be
worked out explicitly, although it’s tedious; see below. The symmetry of the normal
auxiliary variable distribution suggests using the default random set in (12).
The above construction yields a different inferential model for each value ϑ. The key
insight in Martin and Liu (2015a) was to “glue” these inferential models together on
the plausibility contour scale. That is, if py(· | ϑ) was the plausibility contour for the
ϑ-dependent inferential model, then define the glued inferential model to have contour
py({ϑ}) = py({ϑ} | ϑ),
where the localization point varies with the argument to the plausibility contour. Since
the individual inferential models are valid, it is easy to show that the glued version is
valid as well. This gluing was used in other non-regular examples, including those in
Martin and Lin (2016) and in Cheng et al. (2014). In this example, with the default
random set, the glued plausibility contour is
py({ϑ}) = 1−
∣∣∣2Φ(y1 − ϑ+ 13ϑ2/3 (y2 − ϑ1/3)
(1 + 1
9ϑ4/3
)1/2
)
− 1
∣∣∣.
For illustration, I simulate data from the above model with θ = 7. Figure 11 shows
a plot of this glued plausibility contour, along with those obtained by treating y1 and
y2 separately. Since y1 is more informative about θ than y2, it makes sense that the
combined plausibility contour gives that observation more weight.
8 More remarks
8.1 A new take on the fiducial argument
In Section 5.1 I described Fisher’s version of the fiducial argument, circa 1930. That
argument is delightful, but requires too much structure. Dempster (1963, 1964) describes
it in a different way, which I’ll summarize here and then relate back to what’s going on
the valid inferential model construction.
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Figure 11: Plausibility contour for cube-root normal problem, true θ = 7. Dashed lines
are based on the individual data points, while the solid line is after combination using
the differential equation strategy.
Consider the baseline association (9) from which data can be generated, i.e., sample
U ∼ PU , plug into the mapping, for a given θ, and return Y = a(θ, U). Clearly, U and Y
are dependent; in fact, they’re very tightly linked, via a deterministic mapping, so there’s
no joint distribution as usual. If one had a “conditional distribution of U , given Y = y,”
then one could just sample, say U˜ , from that distribution, plug it into y = a(θ, U˜), and
solve for θ to get a draw from its “posterior distribution.” The problem, however, is
that there’s no such conditional distribution, at least not one that’s useful. That is, if
the association mapping a is sufficiently nice, then observing Y = y immediately fixes
U at uy,θ, the solution to the equation y = a(θ, u), where θ is the true value. In other
words, PU |Y=y = δuy,θ , where δx denotes a point mass distribution at x. Of course, this
“conditional distribution” is useless because it depends on the true-but-unknown θ.
If not from probability calculus, where then does the fiducial distribution come from?
The word “fiducial” means based on trust, and Dempster made Fisher’s leap of faith clear.
Indeed, Fisher just defines—or assumes—a particular conditional distribution, namely,
PU |Y=y
set
= PU .
As Dempster described it, Fisher’s suggestion was to “continue to regard” U as if its
distribution where PU even after observing Y = y, effectively ignoring the strong depen-
dence between them. Fisher’s “continue to regard” idea is clever, and has been used for
many years by those working in the fiducial domain.
The point here so far is that, no surprise, it’s not possible to construct a genuine
posterior/conditional distribution out of thin air. And if the fiducial distribution isn’t
built up according to the rules of probability, then it’s again no surprise that it can break
down when one puts the pressure of the probability calculus on it.
At a high level, what causes problems in Fisher’s argument is the fact that Y and U
are too tightly tied together for ordinary probability calculus to handle. That is, if U and
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Y are deterministically linked, as in (9), in a θ-dependent way, then conditioning won’t
work. The question, then, is how to break that tight link? Dempster’s efforts, in a series
of classic papers (Dempster 1966, 1967, 1968a,b, 1969), to develop what he now calls a
state space model that describes all the unknowns and the various manipulations (e.g.,
Dempster’s rule of combination) are carried out is, I think, in this vein.
The approach described in Section 7 has similar motivation and I want to focus the
rest of this subsection on that. As described above, the difficulties with fiducial arise
because there’s too tight of a link between Y and U . On the other hand, our original
inspiration for the above inferential model construction was this tight connection. That
is, if identification of uy,θ were possible, then the true θ could be similarly identified. So
the tight link between Y and U makes it possible to convert the problem of inference
about θ to one of predicting or guess uy,θ. This new task might not seem any easier than
the previous, but the difference is that there’s information available, in the generator
PU , about roughly where uy,θ is located. That information is used to generate random
sets—or “nets”—to be cast in order to catch the fixed uy,θ. There’s no longer any concern
about the link between Y and U because these random sets live on an entirely different
probability space, independent of data and original auxiliary variable. Since the target
uy,θ is a draw from PU , it makes sense to design these random sets that they can hit
targets drawn from PU with some amount of frequency. If that can be arranged, then
the set of solutions ϑ to y = a(ϑ, u) corresponding to u in that set will inherit exactly
the same frequency of containing the true θ, and that’s basically the proof of Theorem 3.
Of course, I would also have the option to choose the random set to be a singleton filled
with a draw from PU , like Fisher’s and Dempster’s solutions, but this typically will not
satisfy the desired validity property. See Liu and Martin (2015).
Therefore, the construction presented in Section 7 above is very much in line with
Fisher’s fiducial argument, most importantly, because the goal is to construct degrees of
belief about the parameter where none had existed before, at least not formally. The key
difference, however, is that the inferential model construction doesn’t simply settle with
whatever comes out of the “continue to regard” step, it proactively seeks out a random
set formulation with the desired validity property.
8.2 Efficiency and optimality
In the above examples, I have primarily made use of the default random set S defined
in (12). In some examples, like the gamma model in Example 1, this choice was for
simplicity, but in others I claimed that the default S was “optimal” in some sense. Here
I want to say a few words about efficiency in the inferential model context, and the
corresponding notion of optimality, which means “most efficient.”
In classical statistics, efficiency can be expressed in terms of small (asymptotic) vari-
ance, e.g., between two confidence intervals that both attain the nominal coverage prob-
ability, the narrower one is more efficient. Recall that the size of the plausibility region
(5) is controlled by the spread of plausibility contour which, in turn, is controlled by the
random set S. So, in the inferential model context, efficiency will be characterized or
determined by the random set S or, rather, its distribution PS .
For the moment, I will write by(·;S) to indicate that the random set S was used in
the construction of the inferential model. Then I’ll say that S is at least as efficient as
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S ′ at hypothesis A, subject to both being valid, if by(A;S) ≥ by(A;S ′) for all y.15 This
implies that bY (A;S) is stochastically no smaller than bY (A;S ′) or, in other words, the
spread of pY (ϑ;S) would tend to be narrower than that of pY (ϑ;S ′).
A first basic result, presented in Martin and Liu (2013), is a complete-class theorem
which says that, for any random set S ′, there exists a nested random set S that is at least
as efficient. This explains why the inferential output is always a possibility function and
not a general belief function. A nested random set has a fixed center, or core, so only
its size and shape can vary. But once the overall shape is fixed, the size is determined
by the need to meet the validity condition. To see this, consider, like in the discussion
around (11), a function h : U→ R and a random set defined by
S = {u ∈ U : h(u) ≤ s(U˜)}, U˜ ∼ PU ,
where s : U→ R is another function that controls the size of S. If s isn’t at least as large
as h everywhere, then validity might fail, and if s > h uniformly, then S is too large, so the
best choice is to take s = h. It is in this sense that the size of the random set is determined
by its shape. So the choice of an efficient S boils down to choosing the appropriate shape.
In certain one-dimensional situations, the optimal shape is known (Martin and Liu 2013).
For example, in symmetric location problems, the optimal random set is itself symmetric,
hence (12) is optimal when U is Unif(0, 1).
Efforts to understand what makes a “good” random set are ongoing, but my current
intuition is that the support of S, i.e., the collection of possible realizations, should match
the contours of the distribution PU , like in Section 7.3.5. What makes formalization of
this intuition non-trivial is that the association mapping a : Θ× U→ Y plays a role, as
does the particular hypothesis A ⊂ Θ that one is interested in.
8.3 Practicalities
There are certainly some differences—philosophical or otherwise—between what has been
presented above and the more traditional statistical analyses, but the practical differences
are not as wide as one might think. Indeed, in those classical examples, such as linear
regression, analysis of variance, etc., the recommended inferential model will have plausi-
bility contour that yields hypothesis tests and confidence intervals that agree with those
presented in the standard textbooks. So, very little in terms of day-to-day operations of
statistics requires a fundamental change.
From an educational point of view, at least for those courses intended for non-statistics
majors in social or biological sciences, instructors could decide if introducing the plausi-
bility contour used to produce the standard hypothesis tests and confidence intervals is
appropriate for their students. But I firmly believe that there is an advantage to using
language like plausibility when communicating statistical ideas to these students com-
pared to the more common probability, confidence, etc. The reason is that these students
know just enough probability to be dangerous. For example, if a student confuses p-value
for a probability, as many do, then he is likely to incorrectly interpret a small p-value as
direct support for the truthfulness of the alternative hypothesis when, in reality, small
15Asking for the inequality to hold uniformly in y is indeed a strong type of efficiency, perhaps too
strong. Replacing this inequality with a distributional inequality is possible, and probably better. The
one result quoted here, however, holds under this strong condition.
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p-value is only indirect support for the alternative, i.e., plausibility of the alternative is
large but its belief could be small. That student may not be able to understand the sub-
additivity properties of plausibility functions, but if he knows that a p-value represents
plausibility instead of probability, and that the former is a different object that can’t
be manipulated by the same rules as the latter, then he’s likely not to make the afore-
mentioned mistake. And in light of the results summarized in Section 8.4, “confidence”
is (mathematically) in direct correspondence to plausibility, so there is no need to use
the former word if the latter is both satisfactory and sufficiently general. For a different
set of students, with more of a mathematical background, ideas about how to carry out
the entire intermediate-level statistics theory course based on plausibility contours are
presented in Martin (2017b).
The majority of real-life data analyses consist of applying those standard methods
taught in the course described above, so little or nothing would change for practicing
statisticians. And it would be straightforward to modify the existing statistical software
programs to return a plot of the plausibility contour if users request it.
That (certain features of) the recommended inferential model agree with traditional
analyses in some problems, of course, does not imply that the solutions would agree in all
problems. Indeed, there are already a number of examples where the inferential model
constructed as above produce different and usually better solutions than other methods.
More on the potential of valid inferential models is presented in Section 9.
8.4 The scope of valid beliefs
My main focus here has been on the construction of a valid inferential model, from which
hypothesis tests and confidence regions with the desired frequentist error rate control
can be immediately read off, as in Theorem 2. But, as is well known, one can get these
decision procedures more directly, without full specification of degrees of belief. In fact,
this is a major advantage of a “frequentist approach,” the ability to break a problem
down and jump directly to calibrated inferences on the quantity of interest.16 There’s
been lots of work over the years developing good—and in some cases optimal—tests and
confidence regions so, for those researchers who prefer to focus on procedures with good
properties, what does a valid inferential model have to offer?
There are results available now which serve as a sort of converse to Theorem 2 above.
Roughly speaking, if there exists a test or confidence region that controls the frequentist
error rate at any specified level α, then there exists valid inferential model—potentially
one that’s glued in the sense of Section 7.3.6—whose plausibility function yields a test
or confidence region at least as good (in terms of efficiency) as the given one. The
first such result was presented in Martin and Liu (2014) in the context of p-values and
hypothesis testing. This justifies my strategy, described in Section 8.3, to use the language
of plausibility when interpreting p-values. That is, it’s not just a superficial similarity
between the two, there is a formal mathematical correspondence.
My more recent results (Martin 2017a) on the connection between valid inferential
models and confidence regions go further. I show that, given a confidence region for a
16I’ve recently been working on an approach by which one can construct marginal posteriors about
parameters of interest directly, without a full posterior first. We’ve been calling these Gibbs posteriors
in Syring and Martin (2016, 2017a,b).
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Figure 12: Plausibility contours corresponding to the Clopper–Pearson confidence interval
for the binomial problem discussed in Section 8.4, along with that derived from the valid
inferential model construction in Martin (2017a); n = 20 and y = 13.
feature φ = φ(θ) of the full parameter, there exists a valid inferential model for θ whose
corresponding marginal plausibility region for φ is at least as efficient as the given one.
Moreover, there’s an algorithm for carrying out this construction. As a quick illustration,
consider again the binomial problem in Example 2. A classical procedure in the literature
is the Clopper–Pearson confidence interval (e.g., Brown et al. 2001), and it is possible
to construct a plausibility contour based on these intervals, which looks a lot like the
plausibility function in Figure 4(a). Using the framework in Martin (2017a), I can convert
the Clopper–Pearson intervals into a valid inferential model, and its plausibility contour
is narrower, see Figure 12, hence the derived plausibility intervals are more efficient.
From Section 1, calibration is essential for reliable statistical inference. This relia-
bility can be achieved by working with a valid inferential model or, to a certain extent,
by developing tests and confidence intervals with frequentist error rate control for each
individual task. The take-away message here is that there’s virtually no loss of flexibility
or efficiency in taking the former perspective since it is always possible to construct an
inferential model whose tests and confidence regions are at least as efficient.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented a summary of my current views on statistical inference
and its foundations. The key foundational point here is that, if one agrees with Reid
and Cox that “calibrated inferences seem essential,” then additive degrees of belief are
not appropriate for describing uncertainty. That is, additive beliefs are afflicted with
false confidence and, therefore, at least for some hypotheses, Theorem 1 says that they
are prone to lead to erroneous conclusions. Two examples in Section 3 showed that the
hypotheses afflicted need not be trivial ones either, so there is a genuine risk. For those
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data analysts who are reluctant to move away from their familiar additive beliefs, it’s
important to be able to identify which hypotheses are at greatest risk of false confidence so
they can mitigate their damages. Towards this, those “impossible” problems highlighted
in Section 3.2 should hold some insights.
My focus here has been on the situation where no prior information is available, which
might be unrealistic. Is nothing really known about θ? What’s typically done is either
the available information is ignored, because it falls short of being a full prior distribu-
tion, or the inevitable information gaps are filled in by something artificial, e.g., default
priors. An ideal situation is that one can incorporate exactly the available information,
no omissions and no additions. Fortunately, there are ways in which this information
can be incorporated into the inferential model framework. Recently, Qiu et al. (2018)
developed a valid inferential model for the case where prior information is available about
nuisance parameters, in the form of a genuine Bayesian prior distribution, but not about
the parameter of interest. A student and I are currently working on a different angle, one
where potentially incomplete prior information is available and to be used but, through
the combination mechanism, will only lead to an improved inferential model, i.e., validity
will be maintained and no efficiency will be lost, regardless of whether the prior is “right”
or “wrong,” but efficiency will be gained when the prior is “right.” The results so far are
promising but still rather limited.
Another interesting direction I’m currently pursuing, one that has a lot in common
with the partial prior problem described above, is that of model uncertainty. For example,
suppose I am entertaining a collection of possible models, indexed byM ∈M , each having
a model parameter θM . A Bayesian framework is equipped to handle such a problem, at
least in principle, but difficulties quickly arise. For example, one might have some vague
prior information about the model itself, e.g., a quantification of Occam’s razor which
puts more weight on simpler models, but rarely does one have genuine prior information
about the individual θM ’s, and the usual rules about non-informative priors don’t apply
when multiple models are under consideration. An idea along these lines is to carry out
the marginalization steps as described in Section 7.2 above to isolate M and, if available,
introduce a sort of “prior” for M along the lines described in the previous paragraph.
Work is in progress and I expect to report on this soon.
That the inferential model constructed in Section 7 is able to achieve the validity
property is exciting, but since there’s no free lunch, there must also be some limitations.
At present, there are still many questions about this framework that I don’t know how to
answer, but I think this is more of an opportunity than a limitation. As far as limitations
are concerned, I’ll mention two here. First, since validity and efficiency are at odds with
one another, and since validity is inflexible, some loss of efficiency is possible. That is, if I
construct a generic inferential model about θ, then it’s possible that the inference based on
by(A) or py(A) for some specific A is not as efficient as that based on some other approach
or method that targets A specifically. If, however, the inferential model is tailored to the
specific hypothesis (or hypotheses) of interest, then my experience is that efficiency can
be maintained. That leads to the second limitation, namely, difficulty. Presently, it is
non-trivial in some cases to carry out the necessary dimension reduction steps to achieve
both validity and efficiency. I will continue to think about ways to automate the process
in certain ways, it’s just hard to imagine what that “black box” would look like. The
Bayesian approach faced similar challenges, and its present popularity is entirely due
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to the advent of Monte Carlo methodology that virtually automated the computations
that had previously been impossible. What will the next breakthrough be? Is a similar
automation of inferential model construction and belief function computation possible?
Now is an exciting time for statisticians and data scientists: lots of job opportunities in
both industry and academia, interesting (“big-data”) research problems with important
real-life consequences, and a new generation of STEM students eager to be trained.
But there are also dangers. As problems become bigger and more complex, we may
reach a point where our intuition is no longer reliable. For example, dependent data
is commonplace in certain applications, and dealing with that dependence is by now
familiar. But modern network problems bring an entirely different meaning to “dependent
data,” i.e., the data is the dependence. Can we really expect our intuitions, developed
largely based on asymptotic approximations in relatively simple cases, to safely guide
us through these new complex problems? After all, false confidence is lurking in this
problem too, and it’s surely even more difficult to spot amidst all the complexity.
I’d like to end, just like I began, by quoting from Barnard (1985):
It seems to be useful for statisticians generally to engage in retrospection at
this time, because there seems now to exist an opportunity for a convergence
of view on the central core of our subject.
Before having put together the results presented in Balch et al. (2017) and the valid
inferential model construction in Martin and Liu (2016), I would’ve said that this “con-
vergence of view” ship had sailed. The difference is that now we understand what can
go wrong in practice with additivity, not just philosophies and generalities, along with a
normative approach for the construction of valid inferential models.
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